The conflict that broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 had (by the time of writing on 4 August) given way to a vigorous propaganda war, without major recent fighting. Both sides, however, continued to import arms and ammunition, and further armed conflict could not be excluded. The boundary dispute which has ostensibly caused it is probably little more than a pretext: the boundary concerned, a straight line between the rivers Mareb and Takazze, is uncontentious, and the obvious problems of administering such a line through hilly country could readily have been resolved. This issue has served largely to enable the governments on either side to consolidate popular support. More plausibly, the conflict derives from Eritrea's ill-thought out introduction of its own currency, the nakfa, in place of the Ethiopian birr. The Eritreans evidently expected the nakfa to circulate at par with the birr, leaving cross-border trade undisturbed, but when it rapidly fell in value, the Ethiopians sought to protect the birr by insisting on exchange at market rates, leaving Eritrea with a depreciated currency and making clear its continued economic dependence on Ethiopia. Eritrea retaliated by abrogating the 1991 agreement giving Ethiopia free access to the ports of Assab and Massawa, and the conflict escalated from there.
That such disputes could lead to armed confrontation, including Eritrean bombing of civilian populations in the northern Ethiopian city of Mekelle, is then explicable only in the context of the legacies of Eritrea's 30-year war for independence. Coming to independence in 1993 with a large and effective army, a deeply etched memory of suffering, a profound suspicion of the outside world, and a boundless confidence in the capabilities of its own people, the Eritrean government has been sensitive to any apparent slight to its national sovereignty and prone to resort to military force. Following an undeclared war against Sudan, and clashes with both Djibouti and Yemen, Ethiopia was the only neighbour with which it was still on good terms.
The impact of the conflict on forced migration depends on the course of the conflict itself. Unlike previous conflicts in the Horn of Africa, this is a straightforward clash across state frontiers between two regimes, each of which generally enjoys popular support in the affected areas. Any displacement is therefore likely to affect only populations directly threatened by war, and its direction is likely to be back into the territory of their own state, which will have a commitment to care for them, rather than across state frontiers. Displaced persons should therefore be absorbed fairly readily into host populations, and return to their homes as soon as it is safe for them to do so, assuming that the conflict is resolved reasonably quickly, and without major upheavals. Outside the conflict zones, both governments have rounded up and in some cases maltreated resident nationals of the other state. Whereas the Eritrean government had expelled the great majority of Ethiopians living in Eritrea in 1991, leaving only a few thousand (many of them in the port of Assab), Eritreans have hitherto been able to live peaceably in Ethiopia, and so a greater number (estimated at over 130,000) are at risk; mass expulsion are however unlikely, unless the war escalates.
The main effects are therefore likely to be indirect, as a result of the impact of the clash on an extremely unstable region. Cross-border trade will be badly damaged. As Ethiopia has been landlocked since Eritrea became independent in 1993, and trade through the Eritrean ports has been blocked, it will need instead to conduct virtually all of its trade through Djibouti, placing considerable strain on transport links, especially to the drought-prone areas of northern Ethiopia. Eritrea is not only chronically food deficient but its economy depends heavily on trade with Ethiopia. Without such trade, the port of Assab has no viable function. Should the conflict escalate to a level at which Ethiopia attacks (or is able to blockade) the Eritrean ports, the effects would be disastrous.
There are likely also to be knock-on effects on the war in Sudan, where both Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported the SPLA/NDA opposition to the regime in Khartoum. These include the transport of supplies across Eritrea and Ethiopia to refugee Sudanese populations along their western frontiers, and to opposition-held areas within Sudan. The impact on the future course of the Sudanese war of a conflict between two of the main opposition supporters is incalculable. So is the effect on the future stability of Eritrea and Ethiopia themselves and this conflict can only have damaging consequences for displaced people and the welfare of the region as a whole.
by Christopher Clapham, Professor of International Relations, Lancaster University