{"id":35918,"date":"2019-10-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2019-10-09T05:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ready-for-feedback3.com\/shape-history\/fmr\/hasegawa\/"},"modified":"2024-08-28T07:55:09","modified_gmt":"2024-08-28T12:55:09","slug":"hasegawa","status":"publish","type":"fmr_content","link":"https:\/\/www.fmreview.org\/ar\/return\/hasegawa\/","title":{"rendered":"Forced to return? Facilitated return of refugees to Myanmar"},"content":{"rendered":"

In early 2016, the conflict in Myanmar appeared to be in a state of transformation. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was signed in October 2015 and the new government came into power in April 2016. The areas of return in the south-east of the country were enjoying a period of relative stability. It was presumed, therefore, that refugees in nine refugee settlements in Thailand would be anxious to return home. In 2016, the governments of Myanmar and Thailand put in place a facilitated return mechanism, with the support of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), but it has failed to generate any significant return momentum, and only 729 refugees out of a population of 100,000 have opted to participate so far.[1]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Stakeholder attitudes<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

One could argue that the return of refugees would have signified peace and the genuine political will of the authorities and the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to move beyond conflict. This could also have been an opportunity for the government to demonstrate its ability to provide protection to minority groups. However, the government, military and EAOs did not necessarily consider the official return of refugees as an immediate priority. Many stakeholders were sceptical of the speed of the political negotiation process, through which <\/span><\/span>the <\/span><\/span>return of refugees may eventually be realised. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was signed by only eight of the 15 EAOs. As such, this Agreement and the subsequent Pyidaungsu Accord (which laid out 37 agreed points <\/span><\/span>towards a peace process) <\/span><\/span>did not provide a solid platform for a return process. With the inauguration of the new government, Myanmar entered a new phase of the State-building process, not the end of it. There were many reforms needed and meanwhile the delicate balance of power between the civilian government and the military had to be negotiated at all levels. On a day-to-day basis, there was some confusion over how authorities\u2019 decision-making processes functioned. In the face of these complexities, the authorities and the EAOs did not prevent the return of refugees but nor were they ready to actively promote it.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The refugees themselves \u2013 who are from Karen and other ethnic groups from south-east Myanmar \u2013 did not push to return, either. There was some excitement over the political changes happening in Myanmar but, for many refugees, the prospect of return was vague and they were reluctant to give up the limited freedoms available to them in the temporary shelters in Thailand without more concrete evidence of the benefits of return. Many refugees had been resettled from Thailand to a third country, and hope persisted among those who remained \u2013 even though resettlement had been phased out \u2013 that they too would be resettled. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The refugees made major decisions collectively, rather than individually; there was a general tendency to follow their leaders who, in turn, were usually influenced by the political positions of the EAOs. The refugees in general had little motivation to participate and take a role in State development and peace building. Many thought that the authorities in Myanmar had not demonstrated sufficiently that they would welcome their return. The refugee leaders were hesitant to fully shift their advocacy activities into Myanmar, and some of them were not willing to lead the return but wanted rather to be the last people to return. The refugees also envisioned return in groups, which had the effect of inhibiting individual decisions to return. Overall, the refugees showed no urgency to return to Myanmar. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The role of the international community<\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The main stakeholders \u2013 the refugees, the authorities in Myanmar and EAOs \u2013 did not think that the time was ripe for return in 2016 and 2017 but some in the international community thought that it was indeed the right time to develop and foster a return momentum among the refugees. At that time, there was no particular pressure from the Government of Thailand, which was instead ready to respect a transitional period in politics, State structure and peace in Myanmar before refugees would be expected to return. Significantly, however, key donors began expressing their intention to curtail funding for NGOs providing assistance in the temporary shelters in Thailand.[2]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> This became a cause for major concern among both the refugees and the NGOs, threatening their very survival. Some NGOs voiced their concerns about the pressure placed on the refugees to return through the cutting of assistance. Others thought that the shifting of assistance from the shelters in Thailand to the return areas of Myanmar was legitimate, especially given that <\/span><\/span>some organisations based in Thailand regularly supported the areas of potential return across the border.<\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The overall context in Myanmar was not conducive to the full-fledged promotion of return with safety and dignity, especially in light of the Rohingya crisis in 2017, but those external actors who favoured repatriation argued that there should, at least, be a mechanism to accommodate those refugees who wished to return voluntarily. UNHCR took on responsibility for the preparations for facilitated returns, and the first facilitated return took place in October 2016. However, even given the reduced assistance in the shelters and the cash incentives provided, only a small number of refugees have opted to return, indicating that the refugees\u2019 concerns are not all about assistance. <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The real obstacles to return<\/span><\/span><\/strong>   <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Focus group discussions on return and reintegration conducted in Myanmar in 2016[3]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> highlighted five areas of deep-seated concern among refugees (and other stakeholders) about the refugees\u2019 potential return: <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n