- May 2024
Host countries hold considerable powers to place forced migrants under surveillance, but, as this case study from Thailand illustrates, forced migrants may use what agency they have to launch digitally mediated counter-surveillance and reconnaissance.
Pictures, videos, media reports and information campaigns that show forced migrants across the world being stopped, arrested, imprisoned and/or deported could lead to the assumption that forced migrants lack agency and are constantly under state surveillance. However, although the agency and power of forced migrants is generally much less than that of security officials, this does not render forced migrants agencyless. In this article, I use the example of the digitally mediated reconnaissance by Myanmar refugees in Mae Sot, Thailand, to show how forced migrants can engage in counter-surveillance.
Forced migration, social media and (counter-) surveillance
Borders are increasingly controlled digitally. Some governments in Europe try to prevent forced and irregular migrants, such as those from Afghanistan, from coming to their borders and shores by using social media campaigns and spreading information that such migrants are not welcome. The Danish government even mounts surveillance on the Facebook profiles of those refugees claiming LGBTQ identities,
On the other hand, refugees may use Facebook for two main reasons: the need to belong to a community and the need for self-representation. The social media platform offers a sense of belonging and the ability to express oneself through producing and sharing posts, comments, pictures and videos. This expression and information sharing can be altruistic and socially oriented, for example, the use of Facebook to seek and share information in the aftermath of disasters.
Information and expression flow in multiple directions among multiple persons or users on a social media or messaging platform. Asylum seekers, refugees and former refugees also use social media for information sharing, for example, for those heading to or already in the Global North. There is less material available on how forced migrants in the Global South share information digitally after fleeing their homes and remaining in neighbouring countries. In this article, I present a contemporary Global South example of Myanmar refugees in Thailand.
Myanmar refugees in Mae Sot, Thailand
Sharing a border with Myanmar to the west, the town of Mae Sot is located in Tak Province in lower northern Thailand. Mae Sot has hosted thousands of Myanmar refugees since the 1980s due to the conflict in Myanmar between ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy groups on the one hand and the Myanmar military on the other hand. Thousands of Myanmar refugees fled to Mae Sot in the aftermath of brutal crack downs on dissent and resistance following the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021.
Refugees from Myanmar are spread across Mae Sot and the surrounding areas in Tak Province. As a group, those who arrived following the 2021 military coup have relatively higher socio-economic and educational backgrounds than those who arrived prior to this. They include young students, academics, activists, social workers and government staff. Many, if not most of them, are tech-savvy, or more specifically Facebook-savvy, having enjoyed affordable, widespread internet access and freedoms of (digital) expression enabled by a liberalised telecommunications industry in Myanmar from 2011 until the coup.
Through lived experience, the new cohort have already mastered the art of circumventing and bypassing draconian internet restrictions and the Facebook ban imposed by the military junta after the coup. They had already created numerous public and private groups on Facebook, Signal and Telegram to share information when they were inside Myanmar. Therefore, the Myanmar refugees and asylum seekers who have arrived in Mae Sot from 2021 are well-prepared to use their tech-savviness. They see themselves as an army of comrades against military dictatorship back home. This strong sense of political camaraderie among them has been very helpful in creating networks and teams of counter-surveillance and reconnaissance to protect themselves in Thailand.
Physical surveillance by security officials in Mae Sot
Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. So, the kingdom is not legally obliged to recognise and treat asylum seekers and refugees from Myanmar as such. While Thailand has largely avoided arresting and deporting the post-2021 refugees, it has not allowed this group of roughly 60,000 people to stay legally in Mae Sot. The border town is effectively a ‘containment zone’ where Myanmar refugees are not able to roam freely or to leave for other parts of Thailand. Without visas and work permits the refugees are rendered vulnerable to (temporary) arrests and extortion by security officials.
One barrier restricting the refugees’ mobility is the use of checkpoints and patrols within and on the way out of the town. The checkpoints and patrols have two functions. The first one is official or lawful, that is to check documents, arrest those without them or with expired or invalid ones and take further action, including deportation. In reality, this official function is rarely fulfilled. The second function is unofficial, informal, or unlawful, that is, to pick up undocumented refugees and demand payments from them in exchange for avoiding arrest or deportation. This function is more common. Refugees have had to pay from a few thousand up to 30,000 baht (around 840 US dollars), or even more.
To avoid arrests and extortions, some Myanmar refugees do not go out at all, but this is not an option for all of them. Therefore, one or two persons from families or groups of people or friends living together usually shoulder the burden of going out. Those who must go out have three options. First, Thai regulations allow foreign workers, including those who entered the kingdom irregularly by crossing the border without a visa or border pass, to obtain labour documentation to work in labour-needy sectors such as fisheries or agriculture. However, refugees and asylum seekers who are not actually employed in these sectors sometimes pay to obtain this documentation as protection against arrest and extortion. Second, some refugees strike informal – but somewhat effective – protection deals with local police by paying monthly fees or bribes of usually 300 baht via brokers. This is less effective than the first option. On many occasions, refugees who have paid bribes to a particular official and broker have faced extortion by another official when their own protector is unreachable. Third, the refugees try to avoid the checkpoints as much as possible. To do so, they need to mount counter-surveillance of the checkpoints and patrols.
Counter-surveillance and reconnaissance by Myanmar refugees in Mae Sot
As of January 2024, about 60,000 or more Myanmar asylum seekers and refugees remain displaced in Mae Sot, staying undocumented, largely immobile and at risk of arrest and extortion if they go out. The refugees have had to take care of and protect themselves from potential arrests, extortions and/or deportation by Thai security officials for more than two years since the coup in Myanmar. In doing so, asylum seekers and refugees not only express their own agency but also significantly enhance it through innovation, testing, usage and further development of the digital tools and platforms at hand.
There are demand and supply sides to Myanmar refugees’ counter-surveillance and reconnaissance of the checkpoints and patrols in Mae Sot. Before going out, individual refugees or groups of them gather intelligence on the whereabouts of the checkpoints and patrols in the town by checking real-time information on Facebook, Telegram and Signal and map out safe routes. On all three platforms, there are private and public groups that may be joined with or without referral or approval by their owners, administrators and managers. This is the demand or user side. On the other hand, communally oriented and tech-savvy Myanmar people in Mae Sot create Facebook Groups, Telegram Channels and Signal Groups, act as or even hire paid or volunteer scouts, and post and share intelligence on the checkpoints and patrols. This is the supply side. The overarching feature of this counter-surveillance and reconnaissance is the use of digital media, although it also relies on human patrols and intelligence gathering on the ground.
From the interviews I conducted with 24 users of those Facebook Groups, Telegram Channels and Signal Groups, they are largely reliable and useful. It is not fail-proof however. The information cannot be accurate at all times; sometimes patrols and checkpoints appear unexpectedly and are not yet on the radar of Myanmar refugees. Compared to checkpoints that are relatively stable for a period of time, patrols in moving cars or motorbikes are more difficult to observe, take note of and report.
Having lived in Mae Sot for close to three years, Myanmar refugees have also managed to detect a pattern of time and location of several regular checkpoints (and of some patrols as well), enabling them to move about in the town relatively freely and without entirely relying on the information they gather online.
The digitally mediated counter-surveillance and reconnaissance by Myanmar refugees in Mae Sot may not be replicable in other locations. The relatively small size of Mae Sot and the limited number of geographic locations of checkpoints and patrols make it relatively easy for refugees to take note of and avoid them; this might not be realistic in bigger towns or a city such as Bangkok.
Similarly, these initiatives on Facebook, Telegram and Signal may not be sustainable in Mae Sot in the long run, as they are heavily reliant on the goodwill and digital efforts of concerned people and fellow citizens. Refugees surreptitiously monitoring Thai check points and patrols may prompt crackdowns by authorities. Due to this potential repercussion from the authorities, civil society and non-governmental organisations may be neither willing nor able to be involved in and run digital counter-surveillance and reconnaissance projects themselves.
Conclusion
The use of digital technology by Myanmar refugees in Mae Sot to monitor Thai security checkpoints and patrols demonstrates their relative power and agency in comparison to the disproportionately larger powers of the Thai state to stop, check, extort, arrest and deport them. It is important to acknowledge not only the role of digital mediation and connectivity but also the refugees’ self-help and agency.
Nyi Nyi Kyaw
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Research Chair on Forced Displacement in Southeast Asia, Chiang Mai University, Thailand
nnkster@gmail.com