- November 2025
A complex interplay of aspirations, capabilities and constraints determines whether people stay or move in response to climate hazards. Understanding how these factors interact can help inform more nuanced interventions.
In the Middle East, where extreme heat, recurrent droughts and intense storms intersect with protracted conflict and fragile governance, climate-related hazards are reshaping lives, livelihoods and movement patterns. Drawing on field research in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, this analysis challenges the assumption that climate change inevitably drives forced displacement and highlights a more nuanced understanding: while severe shocks may prompt many people to move, many others cannot because they are blocked by barriers such as resource constraints, legal hurdles and social obligations. When movement does occur, it is most often within countries, and when cross-border, it tends to remain within the region. For those unable to move, the result is a state of ‘involuntary immobility’. This interplay between environmental drivers and structural obstacles explains why piecemeal interventions often fall short and underscores the need for integrated responses that address both displacement and entrapment.
This article draws on a study conducted by the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) between November 2024 and February 2025 involving 880 household surveys (220 per site) across the governorates of Aden and Al-Maharah in Yemen, Al-Qadissiya in Iraq and Al-Hasakeh in Syria[1]. These were supplemented by in-depth interviews and group discussions with host community members, internally displaced people, migrants and subject-matter experts. It builds on MMC’s conceptual model applying the aspiration–capability framework of migration decision making in the context of climate change and adaptation[2].
Framing climate and agency: the aspiration–capability lens
Climate-driven mobility hinges on two intersecting dimensions: the aspiration to seek safety or opportunity, and the capability to act on that aspiration. Capability includes factors like financial resources, legal permission and social support. When both aspiration and capability are high, people may move voluntarily. Where capability exists but the desire to move remains low, people may stay in place voluntarily despite hazards, possibly pointing to positive adaptation and coping mechanisms. Conversely, when people want to move but cannot, they are left trapped. Finally, when environmental shocks overwhelm the possibility of staying but leave some capacity for movement, forced displacement occurs. For the purpose of this article, the analysis focuses primarily on the latter two outcomes, highlighting key implications for policy and practice.
Involuntary mobility
Forced displacement does not arise from climate hazards alone. It emerges when environmental stressors intersect with structural vulnerabilities, including poverty, weak infrastructure, displacement histories and limited institutional support. These pressures combine to strip people of the ability to remain, leaving movement as the only available option. Importantly, even when such conditions take hold, displacement is often not an immediate response. Findings highlight that in many cases, mobility occurred only after the erosion of multiple support layers, when households could no longer cope in place.
In Aden, unpredictable and heavy rainfall, often leading to flash floods, was the most commonly reported climate-related hazard, with severe impacts on housing and infrastructure. One displaced fisherman in Seera, a district of Aden, put it plainly: “We coexisted with the climate until the floods came and destroyed my dwelling. I had to move to a safe place.” Focus group participants, particularly from migrant and displaced communities living in informal shelters in Aden, described facing repeated damage to their homes during heavy rains. In some cases, this reportedly forced households to evacuate when shelters became uninhabitable, prompting renewed displacement among those already uprooted by conflict, hardship and earlier climate-related shocks. These groups were often located in flood-prone areas with limited protection, heightening their exposure to loss and disruption. This example illustrates how sudden-onset hazards can lead to displacement when physical exposure intersects with inadequate shelter. It also highlights the reported failure of housing systems and disaster preparedness mechanisms to protect those most at risk.
In Al-Hasakeh, fewer households reported recent displacement due to climate, but interviewees emphasised how environmental degradation had contributed to a broader collapse in livelihoods. As agricultural land became barren and income sources dwindled, some households reportedly found they could no longer survive in place. Weak governance and limited institutional capacity to regulate water use or support farmers further accelerated this decline. One Syrian respondent described the decision to move: “What happened in terms of climatic changes in recent years is the straw that broke the camel’s back regarding migration because it prompted many people to resolve the matter and to move.” This case illustrates how slow-onset climate change, when layered onto existing economic and governance challenges, can overwhelm coping capacities and lead to displacement. In such contexts, mobility often marks the point at which cumulative stress becomes insupportable.
These examples illustrate that involuntary mobility is not about sudden flight alone. Rather, it often follows the failure of multiple systems, including livelihoods, shelter, infrastructure and institutional support, that once enabled people to stay. Movement becomes inevitable when these systems collapse, not necessarily when hazards strike. Addressing forced climate-related mobility requires early intervention to reinforce these systems before thresholds are crossed. This includes efforts to bolster housing resilience, restore degraded livelihoods and provide inclusive support to displaced populations and those at risk of being displaced.
Across the research sites, most reported displacement was to other areas within the same country, often from rural districts to towns or cities. Cross-border moves were less common and generally regional, reflecting a mix of factors such as support networks, costs of migrating further afield, administrative requirements and, in some cases, preference for staying closer to home.
Involuntary immobility
Remaining in place is not always a reflection of resilience. Across all four governorates, many households that wanted or needed to move reported being unable to do so due to a combination of financial, legal and procedural barriers. In these cases, urgent risk did not translate into action, leaving families stranded in deteriorating conditions.
Survey findings from Aden revealed that a large proportion of respondents had considered relocating but were unable to follow through. Among those who expressed a desire to move, most pointed to the inability to afford housing and basic needs at the destination as key barriers. While the predominantly urban setting offered some services and infrastructure, widespread unemployment and high living costs reportedly kept many families in place. This example highlights how limited economic capacity can entrench involuntary immobility even in cities, where relocation might otherwise appear more feasible.
Financial constraints were even more pronounced in Al-Qadissiya. Drought-related crop failures had undermined incomes and deepened existing poverty, and many households that wanted to move lacked the resources for transport, rent or resettlement. As one interviewee explained, “We no longer have the capacity to migrate or open new projects outside the region, forcing us to remain in the region and rely on small plots of agriculture to meet basic needs.” These findings show how immobility in rural areas is often a reflection not of preference, but of severe resource deprivation.
In Al-Hasakeh, immobility was shaped by administrative and institutional hurdles. Households reported that movement was limited by the lack of documentation, restricted mobility permissions and fragmented control across different authorities. Even when income or support networks were present, these barriers made it difficult or impossible to relocate. The result is a form of enforced stillness, where households are effectively locked in place by governance and legal systems.
In this sense, immobility is not always a stable state; it can reflect a limbo of uncertainty, marked by stalled intentions and unrealised plans. In some cases, such intentions may be tied to concrete steps such as saving for transport or securing documentation, while in others they may be more aspirational, reflecting hopes for change rather than strategies that are realistically within reach.
Together, these cases point to a consistent pattern: involuntary immobility is not incidental. It is the predictable outcome of intersecting constraints preventing movement, even when the desire or need to relocate is strong. Addressing this often-overlooked dimension of climate risk requires not only supporting those who move but also removing barriers that entrap those left behind and strengthening in situ resilience and protection for people to remain safely if they choose to.
Intersecting constraints and blurred boundaries
While the aspiration–capability framework distinguishes between involuntary mobility and involuntary immobility, the line between the two is often difficult to draw in practice. Many households do not fall neatly into one category or the other. Instead, they navigate a spectrum of constraints that shift over time and vary by context.
Some households that managed to move did so through unsustainable or exploitative means, such as selling off essential assets, taking on debt or accepting precarious work conditions in destination areas. In these cases, mobility occurred but it did not come from a position of agency. Others who appeared immobile had previously moved but returned due to insecurity, unaffordability or poor living conditions, as seen in parts of Al-Maharah and Aden, underscoring the unsustainability of their earlier mobility. These return dynamics blur the distinction between those who move and those who stay, revealing how displacement and immobility can overlap, and even become cyclical.
This complexity underscores the need to move beyond binary classifications. Understanding how capability and aspiration interact, sometimes enabling movement, sometimes forcing stillness, can help identify which barriers are most pressing, which groups are most vulnerable and when, and which types of intervention might be most effective. It also highlights the need for flexible, context-specific approaches that recognise the overlapping pressures people face and the fluidity of mobility over time.
Implications for policy and practice
Climate-related (im)mobility cannot be addressed through isolated or hazard-specific interventions. Effective responses must consider the full spectrum of mobility outcomes, including supporting those who are displaced, those who are stuck in place and those navigating precarious forms of movement in between. This demands integrated approaches that address both structural barriers and systemic support gaps.
First, interventions should be designed with dual targets in mind. The same outreach that delivers assistance to displaced households can also reach those immobilised by a lack of documentation, income or transportation. In flood-affected areas, for example, coordinated packages could combine cash, legal and housing assistance to help people recover or relocate safely, regardless of whether they have already moved or remain at risk.
Second, anticipatory action must extend beyond early warning systems. When drought or storm risks are identified, response plans should include pre-arranged support for both in-place adaptation and voluntary relocation. Seed vouchers, transport stipends and mobile legal clinics can help households prepare for multiple scenarios rather than react to crises after the fact.
Third, identifying invisible constraints is key. Regular surveys and community engagement should include questions about unrealised mobility intentions and perceived barriers to movement. This allows governments and aid actors to detect pockets of entrapment early and target support to those who might otherwise be overlooked. In areas like Al-Hasakeh or Al-Qadissiya, for instance, such insights could inform microloans distribution, documentation drives or targeted infrastructure upgrades.
Finally, policy frameworks should embrace both mobility and staying as potential forms of positive climate adaptation. Rather than viewing movement solely as a failure to adapt, programmes can facilitate safe, flexible options such as circular permits, seasonal work schemes or decentralised relocation assistance, while investing in resilience building and in-place adaptation so that staying is a voluntary and sustainable choice. This helps turn constrained mobility into a planned transition and prevents immobility from becoming an enduring form of risk.
By approaching displacement and immobility as interconnected outcomes of shared constraints, policy and practice can become more responsive, inclusive and effective under conditions of accelerating climate stress.
Final thoughts
Climate-related mobility in the Middle East cannot be understood as a simple movement of people responding to environmental hazards. It is shaped by an interplay of aspiration, capability and constraint, producing outcomes that range from forced displacement to involuntary immobility. What unites these experiences is not the hazard itself, but the barriers that determine who can move, who cannot, and on what terms.
Findings from Yemen, Iraq and Syria indicate that mobility patterns are largely short-range, with movement usually remaining within national borders and, when crossing them, more often to nearby countries within the region. They reveal that displacement often occurs only after multiple systems, such as livelihoods, shelter, infrastructure, and support networks, have eroded. Simultaneously, immobility is rarely a choice. It reflects entrenched obstacles, from financial hardship to administrative restrictions, which leave households stuck even when conditions deteriorate.
Effective responses must confront these dual realities head-on. This means bolstering resilience at origin through income support, legal protections and basic services, while expanding safe and flexible mobility options for those needing or wishing to move. It also requires identifying and addressing invisible forms of entrapment, where people are left behind not by preference, but by circumstance.
As climate impacts deepen, more households will be forced to navigate this spectrum of constrained options. Policymakers and practitioners must move beyond binary categories of ‘migrants’ and ‘non-migrants’ to recognise the fluid, pressured and uneven nature of climate-induced (im)mobility. Only by expanding choice and dismantling barriers can climate responses uphold agency, equity and protection in the years ahead.
Wassim Ben Romdhane
Middle East Mixed Migration Project Coordinator, Mixed Migration Centre
benromdhane@mixedmigration.org
Bram Frouws
Director of MMC, Mixed Migration Centre
frouws@mixedmigration.org
@Mixed_Migration
linkedin.com/in/bram-frouws-90a0b38
Jennifer Vallentine
Senior Research Consultant, Mixed Migration Centre
vallentine@mixedmigration.org
linkedin.com/in/jennifervallentine
Mixed Migration Centre
linkedin.com/company/mixedmigration-centre/
https://bsky.app/profile/mixedmigration.org
[1] Mixed Migration Centre (2025) Climate and Mobility in the Middle East
[2] Carling, J. & Schewel, K. (2017) Revisiting aspiration and ability in international migration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
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