{"id":35265,"date":"2017-11-23T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2017-11-23T05:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ready-for-feedback3.com\/shape-history\/fmr\/dewet\/"},"modified":"2024-08-27T14:32:32","modified_gmt":"2024-08-27T19:32:32","slug":"dewet","status":"publish","type":"fmr_content","link":"https:\/\/www.fmreview.org\/fr\/dewet\/","title":{"rendered":"Improving outcomes in development-induced displacement and resettlement projects"},"content":{"rendered":"

Resettlement guidelines formulated by funders, governments and international treaties have achieved only limited success in reversing these negative consequences. Not all private sector funders or governments respect guidelines. Neither international law nor national legal systems make adequate provision for ‘development oustees’. Poorly informed and planned, non-consultative and badly implemented resettlement projects continue to result in impoverishment and social disruption and provoke resistance.<\/font><\/p>\n

In order to inform policy making, the Refugee Studies Centre undertook a four-year (1997-2001) development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) research project funded by the UK’s Department for International Development. Systematic literature surveys were undertaken of published and unpublished sources, including academic research, international funding agencies' resettlement guidelines, national and state resettlement policies, relevant international treaties and legal cases and literature from NGOs and social movements. Interviews were also conducted with a range of academics, officials, implementing agents, NGOs and activists in Brazil, Canada, India, Switzerland, Uganda and the USA. <\/font><\/p>\n

Brief summaries of the main findings and policy implications of the four desk studies undertaken by the project are given below.<\/font><\/p>\n

Addressing policy constraints and improving outcomes in DIDR projects<\/b><\/font><\/p>\n

by Alan Rew, Eleanor Fisher and Balaji Pandey<\/font><\/p>\n

The extent and the negative consequences of DIDR indicate serious policy failures with implications for the scope and limits of development policies and their implementation. Explanations of DIDR's dismal record typically appeal to the absence of national legal and policy frameworks and political will to redress the needs of the displaced. The nature of ‘the DIDR problem’ is more fundamental, as it is inherent in the institutional process of resettlement and rehabilitation itself. Implementation is inherently problematic. Almost always an ‘implementation deficit’ obstructs the hypothetical smooth translation of policy into action as policy gets transformed by the very process of implementation.<\/font><\/p>\n

The normative frameworks formulated by high level policy makers do not necessarily involve clear policy goals for they have to be broad enough to reconcile divergent and even contradictory political positions. This paves the way for differing interpretations of policy further down the bureaucratic hierarchy.<\/font><\/p>\n

Resettlement and rehabilitation policies are coordinated and implemented at the level of government departments and district administration. There are weaknesses in the chains of communication and decision making due to work pressures, insufficient capacity and problems of coordination between agencies. Though resettlement officers cope as best they can, the result is invariably the development of ad hoc<\/i> institutional arrangements. Local officials exercise considerable discretion as they develop operational routines. This allows for cutting corners and corruption. For the affected population, the local resettlement officer is<\/b> the government; his or her decisions are<\/b> policy. Implementation takes on a life of its own.<\/font><\/p>\n

At the national level, policy reform requires greater clarity and specification of goals as well as the development and enforcement of a coherent vision and framework of DIDR policy issues around human rights, sustainable development and poverty elimination. This framework should incorporate perspectives of affected people. Donors could facilitate the reform process by paying closer attention to the way rights and entitlements are safeguarded in major development projects.<\/font><\/p>\n

Lines of authority and responsibility need to be clarified between central, state or provincial and local governments, as well as between government and the private sector interests which are increasingly becoming involved in DIDR projects. At the ground level, the discretion exercised by local officials could be kept in check by monitoring by civil society groups and NGOS – which would require a financial and political commitment by government to the institutions of civil society.<\/font><\/p>\n

Addressing legal constraints and improving outcomes in DIDR Projects <\/font><\/b><\/p>\n

by Michael Barutciski<\/font><\/p>\n

Neither the areas of international law that address forced migration (ie refugee and humanitarian law) nor formulations concerning IDPs offer much protection to people displaced by DIDR projects. DIDR occurs in the name of an ostensibly greater good. The government causing the displacement is also responsible for ensuring the protection of the people it has displaced. International treaties (such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) offer only limited protection to DIDR displacees. Not many countries have incorporated these provisions into their national legal systems, and states have considerable discretion in determining the nature of consultation and participation regarding affected people. <\/font><\/p>\n

European Community aid grants stipulate that the recipient state should uphold the human rights provisions of the Fourth Lome Convention. However, enforcement remains problematic, as evidenced by the eviction of tens of thousands of people from the Kibale Game Corridor in Uganda, in violation of Lome IV provisions. <\/font><\/p>\n

Perhaps the most promising development at the international level has been the 'soft law' of the resettlement guidelines drawn up by international funders which make loans dependent upon borrower countries respecting the rights of those to be displaced. Foremost among these is the World Bank's guidelines on resettlement (1<\/a>) which require consultation with the affected people, and their planned resettlement, compensation and rehabilitation. However, even with a body as powerful as the World Bank, the fundamental problem remains one of enforcement. The fact that the World Bank has an explicitly non-political mandate means that it may lack the means effectively to confront governments which ignore its guidelines.<\/font><\/p>\n

At issue is respect for the rights of DIDR displacees. These rights are frequently abused because of a problematic internal relationship between states and individual citizens. International law recognises that states should be allowed to solve their internal problems by themselves, and is unlikely to sanction intervention in DIDR projects which are ostensibly in the national interest.<\/font><\/p>\n

Effective legal action at international level requires mechanisms which allow for individual complaints and which create sufficient pressure to ensure respect for basic norms. The World Bank's Inspection Panel is the first forum where private parties can hold an international organisation accountable. The effectiveness of such mechanisms depends on the preparedness of international organisations to jeopardise economic projects in the interests of human rights. This may depend on public pressure and the acceptance that human rights make good economic as well as moral sense.<\/font><\/p>\n

However, their essentially non-political mandates limit the extent to which financial institutions can link loans to human rights. Governments making loans and providing aid are able to take open political stands and to push for such conditionalities. An international alliance of funding and other institutions would provide for greater authority and enforceability. The European Parliament's call for internationally accepted monitoring mechanisms is a positive step in this regard. Public pressure and access to legal procedure increases participation and accountability, and government agencies such as DFID could also consider further support for NGOs and pressure groups providing human rights and legal support to those in danger of displacement. <\/font><\/p>\n

Toward local level development and mitigating impoverishment in DIDR<\/font><\/b><\/p>\n

by Dolores Koenig (2<\/a>)<\/font><\/p>\n

Recent attempts to understand why resettlement outcomes have not shown anticipated improvements have been inadequate because they have focused on the economic aspect, neglecting the political. They have concentrated on the resettled communities themselves, neglecting their relationship to their wider regional and national systems. Cernea's risks and reconstruction model has been extremely useful in identifying the risks inherent in resettlement (3<\/a>) and in suggesting ways to deal with these risks so as to reconstitute economic livelihoods and socio-cultural systems. It has, however, been less effective at addressing such political aspects of DIDR as differences in power among people in affected communities, the human rights of the displaced, their local autonomy and control, and their ability to affect their interactions with national institutions – all of which are integral to sustainable development. Resettlement impoverishes people by taking away their political power, notably to decide how and where to live. It disrupts the control that a local social group has over its social institutions, and increases their political marginalisation. People lose resources (ie become impoverished) because they lack the cultural, economic, political and social capital to make their claims and rights heard effectively.<\/font><\/p>\n

The fact that the state often serves as both implementer and referee in resettlement situations puts it in a powerful position. However reluctantly, states do respond to pressures. The question becomes one of how to integrate resettled people into their national political and economic systems so that they can put pressure on their governments and increasingly participate as equal citizens.<\/font><\/p>\n

Key constraints on resettlement projects failing to achieve their goals include:<\/font><\/p>\n