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LINKING POPULAR INITIATIVE AND AID AGENCIES: THE CASE OF REFUGEES
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INTRODUCTION

The existence of refugees as an international "problem" has a longstanding tradition of recognition. Over recent years, concern has broadened to include not only those formally defined as "refugees" but also those "internally displaced". Further, the creation of refugee producing situations has been framed within the post-colonial development process, particularly in Africa, and has been linked with the foreign policies of the world's major economic and military powers (Loescher, 1986). In a parallel manner, there is a comparably longstanding record of humanitarian assistance to refugees. The host populations, host governments, the UNHCR and local and international private, non-governmental organisations have provided assistance to refugees in settling in the host countries, in countries of asylum and in some cases in repatriation.

The current increased international attention to addressing the unresolved issues is encouraging. This is especially important, since not only "old" issues remain to receive fresh approaches but because the current solutions are now recognized as creating new problems. Attempts to highlight these problems were evident in the Oxford Symposium in 1984, 'Assistance to Refugees: Alternative Viewpoints', and in the 1985 ICVA/UNHCR 'Workshop on Development Approaches to Refugees'. These meetings began to articulate the unresolved issues of organisation and participation and to point to ways of improving on the current situation.

The purpose of the present paper is to aid in the search for means to address the question: 'Where and How do we go from here?' It
must accomplish the following four objectives. First, it is necessary to sketch the "refugee experience". Second, the importance of the labelling process, for its nature, objectives and consequences—both for refugee and for those providing humanitarian assistance—will be explicated. Third, the nature of assistance in development more generally, and for refugees in particular, will be examined. Finally, some aspects of relearning will be explored concerning refugees and the development process.

THE QUALITIES OF BEING A REFUGEE
Refugees are commonly thought of as a unique category of people in society. That is, they are exceptional, outside of normal social experience and disoriented (or even without orientation) because of their group flight in which they were forced to leave "everything" behind. Migrants, on the other hand, are perceived as rational, calculating, deliberate and transferring their best capabilities in the process of relocating. While not attempting to downplay the significant differences, there is a very important need to recognize the similarities. Particularly important is the neglected dimension of refugees as conscious, active human beings before, during and after their flight in a similar manner to migrants. This will be later shown to have implications for the condition of being a refugee and for receiving humanitarian assistance.

Myriad theories of migration have been proposed which have centered on economic explanations of cost-benefit, income maximisation or expected income gains based on comparisons of present and alternative situations (see Todaro, 1976, for a review). Some recent work has examined the broader social structural context. At the micro level, this has involved consideration of familial roles, status and stage in the life cycle. At the macro level, position of an individual or family in the socioeconomic structure and of populations in the world economy have been examined (Shaw, 1974; Roberts, 1982; Peek and Standing, 1983; Portes and Walton, 1981; Timberlake, 1985). The existence of "stress" in the present situation, variously defined, and of perceptions of alternatives figure importantly in models of migration and decision-making behavior. One need not subscribe to the idea of "maximisation" of benefits; perhaps a more appropriate assumption concerning migration is that of risk "minimisation" and the "maximisation" of alternative sources of support.

Migrants are, first and foremost, people in social units who think, learn, perceive, decide, and act. Migration is one of those actions and is undertaken as a consequence of the prior learning, perceiving, and deciding that people do as individuals and in groups. At the same time, of course, migration also affects the social and cognitive worlds of the migrants, who must come to grips in some way with the consequences of their actions (Oliver-Smith and Hansen, 1982:2). Studies of migrants' adaptation, whether rural to urban or international, are well documented in the available literature. Migrants are generally seen as "innovating", improving themselves, achieving, adapting. While differences exist, migrants seem capable of adapting their previously learned skills to improving their status and well-being.

Refugees are perceived as different. Refugees, of course, are those persons outside their country of origin who, due to well founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to return. Kunz (1973:131) refers to refugees as "the movement of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction, their path is governed by kinetic factors". Kunz (1981) updated his earlier work to incorporate a broader conceptualisation of refugee flight and resettlement. He identified refugees' attitudes toward displacement and host society factors (e.g., cultural compatibility and social receptiveness as being important factors in the refugees' experiences, particularly assimilation. Stein (1981) further elaborates the refugee experience in the following "stages": perception of a threat; decision to flee; the period of
extreme danger and flight; reaching safety; camp behavior; settlement, resettlement or repatriation; adjustment and acculturation; and residual states and changes in behavior caused by the refugee experience. When relocated in a new society, "the patterns of behavior that sustained life at home are no longer sufficient. The refugee is uncertain about how to mobilize his resources to succeed in his new home" (Stein, 1981:328).

Conflicting views exist about how refugees act in their new environment. Forced migrants, including refugees, are sometimes labelled "conservative" in that they move geographically in order to maintain their social, economic and cultural characteristics (Oliver-Smith and Hansen, 1982:3; Scudder and Colson, 1982:275). Some perceive refugees as insatiably demanding, with high expectations for maintaining their economic status and not losing "anything" because of their flight and relocation. Further, refugees' demands are seen to generate bitterness and suspicion of the government and assistance agencies.

A vicious spiral can set in: refugees are helped because they are helpless; they must display their need and helplessness; the caseworker cannot accede to all who are needy and must shield himself from emotional involvement; the cool attitude of the caseworker conveys suspicion to the refugee about his truthfulness; if they won't believe the truth the refugee inflates it; hearing exaggerated stories the caseworker becomes suspicious (Stein, 1981:327).

What is problematic here, and thus far unquestioned, is whether or not refugees are indeed helpless, or merely labelled so. The implications of this for understanding the origin and possible solutions for this "vicious spiral" will be elaborated in the next section.

Attempts to cling to the familiar and change no more than is necessary represent efforts to reduce the possibility that further stress will occur. Whether such turning inward, or involution, interferes with refugees' adaptation is also problematic. What is important—and unfortunately poorly documented—is that refugees' progress to the stage of an open-ended society, one characterized by increasing initiative and risk taking and potential development. When refugees play an active role in reconstructing their environment and thereby reestablish a positive image of themselves, the transition stage is likely to be shorter (Oliver-Smith and Hansen, 1982:275). The conservative outlook may be less a hindrance than is commonly believed. Reaching the stage of initiative and risk-taking may indeed be contingent on transferring old skills for economic and domestic activities and/or re-establishing familiar institutions and symbols by relocating with kin, neighbors and coethnics to create a sense of community albeit modified. Such maintenance, reconstruction and initiative are integral observations of migrants' behavior more generally.

LABELLING AND DEVELOPMENT
The former ways of living among migrants and refugees have to this point been portrayed as they are commonly defined as static. Alternatively, indigenous knowledge may more accurately be understood as a process of initiative, experimentation, adoption and accumulation. While a strong basis for developing such initiatives already exists in so-called "traditional" societies, it has gone largely unrecognised as a result of the general tendency to regard indigenous systems as incapable of generating within themselves the momentum for change (Howes, 1979:18).

In "development" generally, and in the case of refugees more particularly, interaction with "experts" may undermine the foundations for indigenous initiative in the process of new knowledge. Experts and administrators depend on "scientific" knowledge to legitimise their superior status. They have a vested interest in devaluing ITK (indigenous technical knowledge) and in imposing a sense of dependence on the part of their rural clients.
This suggests that change may only be brought about through an assault at the level of ideology, and through a reorientation of reward systems (Howes and Chambers, 1979:7). Howes and Chambers (1979:9-10) further note that junior staff are particularly prone to exaggerate differences between themselves and local people; the distinction between "superior" and "inferior" knowledge protects and legitimises their yet insecure status.

Perhaps the most serious problem is that indigenous populations themselves have now come to accept that there are different types of knowledge, and that their own is inferior (Howes, 1979:21). In turn, this destroys the process of developing indigenous knowledge and reduces the number of options open at the grassroots level.

All social interaction and communication involve labelling, in which we abstract from the individual, create stereotypes which emphasize certain aspects of people's lives and relate to them on that dimension. Without labels, social relations would be anarchic, chaotic and unpredictable - in a word, "impossible". Labelling is used as more than a simple convenience, however, for it is central to our patterned behavior, i.e., our social institutions. As Wood (1985:349) notes:

perhaps it is more accurate to see labelling as designation. Thus the validity of labels becomes not a matter of substantive objectivity but of the ability to use labels effectively in action as designations which define parameters for thought and behavior, which render environments stable, and which establish spheres of competence and areas of responsibility. In this way labelling through these sorts of designations is part of the process of creating social structure. It is people making history by making rules for themselves and others to follow. By this logic labels are also relative and contingent - social constructs which reflect patterns of authority and the acceptance of it in the context of particular events and conjunctures.

Ultimately, labelling refers to asymmetrical relationships of power through which the labels of some are imposed on other people. As Wood (1985:351) states, "there is an imposition of specific interests and values represented as universally valid through the deployment of apparently rational categories and technical language". Once accepted in common usage, such ideological designations appear natural, objective and value-free. Labelling is central to all policy formulation and administration. Moreover, it possesses its own dynamic characteristics. Those who create and successfully impose labels in effect determine the rules of access to and allocation of resources in society. Distinctions between people are made on the basis of criteria which may not be central, or self-evident, to them. "People are thus compelled to adjust their behavior, to redefine the way they present themselves in order to handle access successfully" (Wood, 1985:352). Behavior according to one's expected "role" is sanctioned.

Labels contain a more insidious, if largely unrecognized, feature. They do not reveal the history and dynamics of how people act and survive. In creating a new identity on the basis of a person's relationship to an institutional activity or programme, people are transformed into objects - recipients, clients or even "participants". Conforming one's behavior to the label may endanger the social relations and obligations through which survival is managed (Wood, 1985:368). The active and interactive process through which people evolved to their present situation is thereby either ignored or obliterated. But is it the individual, and not the "recipient", who will have to adjust and go on living (Zetter, 1985:443).
ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

The dimensions of the refugee "problem" are evident in its magnitude and conditions. Among Africa's approximately 5 million refugees, most are resident in rural areas of countries adjacent to their own countries of origin. In contrast to those from South-East Asia who have been predominantly relocated to countries of permanent asylum in the industrialized world, most refugees in Africa remain there—either settling in their host societies or occasionally repatriating (Rogge, 1985:72). Under such circumstances, international assistance to refugees has been particularly important and had a profound impact. Thus, the following discussion concerns the nature of assistance to rural refugees in Africa, though it has implications for refugees in other situations as well.

Despite more than three decades of foreign assistance to African countries, the net impact is very uneven and inconclusive. While specific programmes and projects undertaken are clearly discernible for their successes, an integrated and cumulative effect is rarely observed. Rather than suggesting that more needs to be done along similar guidelines, Morss (1984) and Lipton (1986) have described the actual "institutional destruction" which has resulted from donor and project proliferation in African countries— a process that has accelerated in the last decade. The disparate and often conflicting objectives of donors most frequently are disarticulated from the comprehensive and consistent national development objectives and policies of recipient countries. Indeed, most African countries do not have institutional bases comparable to those found in Asia and Latin America which are sufficient to withstand the "donor rush" (Morss, 1984:468).

Accepting the donors' currently fashionable objectives results in recipient countries re-defining, or relabelling, their perceptions of their own needs and solutions. Recipient governments must devote considerable energy to supporting, these programmes and projects. While project consolidation and re-orienting are ultimately necessary, they are unlikely because of the competitive nature of donor interactions (Morss, 1984). Such competition among donors is even seen to detract from their own individual goals (Lipton, 1986).

Further, the possibilities for generating self-sustaining projects are hindered by two fundamental factors because the "experts" which typically accompany aid are principally accountable to their financiers. First, project evaluations which are critical, frank and genuinely independent are seldom published (Lipton, 1986:2). Second, implementers without the power to make their own decisions are unable to learn through trial and error how they can most effectively plan and act.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs, alternatively termed private voluntary organizations, or PVOs) are seen to contribute more in the area of personnel and administrative expertise than in financing (Gorman, 1985:88). NGOs are expected to be more effective because of the congruence of their power with the involvement and participation of the recipients of assistance (Blaser, 1984:83; Gorman, 1984:41). More importantly, "PVOs (NGOs) may act more often than not as efficient vehicles for expanded or improved use of existing program approaches or services than as actual innovators of such approaches " (Gorman, 1984:57). That is, NGOs are seen as having moved from relief and welfare modes of assistance to supporting self-help initiatives during the last decade.

The expectation that NGOs operate in fundamentally different ways from international or national governmental aid agencies is not well supported by evidence. Gorman (1984:58) notes that NGOs can be as guilty as other donors in the top-down creation, articulation and implementation of programs. Confusion, mismanagement and misguided relief efforts are more common than most would care to admit (Gorman, 1985:88). NGO staff are often
most would care to admit (Gorman, 1985:88). NGO staff are often young and relatively inexperienced and turnover is high. Further, few detailed reports of any kind—especially critical ones—are published. In addition, there is little independent research concerning the operations or effectiveness of NGOs (Harrell-Bond, 1986).

At least part of the dilemma stems from the overall focus of NGOs in what is necessarily a very competitive "entrepreneurial" world (Gorman, 1984:98)

It might be noted, parenthetically, that refugee and disaster relief operations make headlines, thus easing the task PVOs (NGOs) face in earning aid dollars from what is a more typically inattentive public in regard to longer term development issues. For this reason, many PVOs are reluctant to get into the development business to the exclusion of relief. Nevertheless, many PVOs have come to realize that by focusing on long-term development issues, they might help to eradicate the underlying conditions of poverty which in turn often exacerbate relief situations when they do occur (Gorman, 1984:51).

Unfortunately, evidence that NGOs succeed in their recent commitment to promote self-sustaining development is quite spotty (Gorman, 1984:44,58; Calavan, 1984:224).

It is often argued that it is unfair to insist that NGO projects succeed in terms of benefits exceeding costs, sustainability and replicability because most assistance projects fail anyway (Ellis, 1984:208). Explanations offered which maintain that it is difficult to know what measure of success to use and that see the projects NGOs attempt to be inherently risky inadvertently underscore the need to look more closely at the structure and process of relief assistance administration.

Formally organized assistance to refugees in Africa has a modern history of nearly a quarter-century. Several noteworthy success efforts of settling and integrating refugees into the local host communities exist and are described by Rogge (1985). In Tanzania, assistance to refugees from Rwanda and Burundi and pre-independence Mozambique has contributed to a high degree of self-sufficiency. Communal work efforts, utilizing materials supplied by UNHCR, produced cleared fields, the construction of housing, schools, clinics and roads. Mutually beneficial interaction with the local population, in which refugees received support and in turn shared their externally-funded facilities, was clearly important. In Tanzania and in Botswana, refugees were made eligible for host-country citizenship. Botswana's programme for assistance to refugees included agricultural schemes, fisheries and handicraft projects and seasonal wage labour opportunities. The varied forms of assistance for the large numbers of refugees in the Sudan include rural land settlements, rural wage earning settlements and suburban settlements (Karadawi, 1983; Rogge, 1985). Overall, these are encouraging results in which an important degree of self-sufficiency among refugees has been achieved. From these examples and others, we can be encouraged that a variety of alternative forms of assistance, in conjunction with relative autonomy for the refugees, have developed. To date, however, only very limited systematic evaluation has been undertaken to strengthen our knowledge of such successes (Chambers, 1979:390).

The rapid increase in the number of refugees in Africa during the past decade has been accompanied by the increased articulation of problems about assistance to refugees (Harrell-Bond, 1985; 1986; Karadawi, 1983). Whether such observations are due to 1) actual growing problems; 2) more systematic in-depth independent research about central problems; 3) the accumulation of lessons not properly learned; or 4) given the current modus vivendi, impossible to learn, is difficult to ascertain. What is important is to understand them as a basis for constructive criticism.
Humanitarian assistance has recently been characterized as being 'in a straightjacket' in a way which encapsulates the previous discussion (Harrell-Bond, 1985). Faced with financial needs which escalate in increasing proportion to the growth of refugee populations, the inter-agency competition over funding sources necessitates the 'packaging and marketing' of refugees (Harrell-Bond, 1985:5). Further observations concerning factors which are detrimental to refugees' becoming self-sufficient have been described in detail by Karadawi (1983), Mason and Brown (1983) and Harrell-Bond (1986) as follows: 1) aid agencies and host governments often have conflicting goals which result in exacerbation of the refugees' situation; 2) refugees themselves have been ignored throughout the decision-making process in the three phases of relief, rehabilitation and development; and 3) the concept of 'humanitarian assistance' and the relief programmes designed by aid agencies, as well as the laws and regulations designed by governments, have contributed to the powerlessness of the refugee recipients.

At this point, it is instructive to recall the earlier discussion of labelling. 'The lasting impression engendered by refugees around the world is that of a victim, a kind of immigrant and, perhaps most importantly, a client in need of assistance' (de Voe, 1981:88). The primary conclusions of de Voe and Zetter (1985) from their respective studies were that Tibetan and Greek Cypriot refugees were 'framed', or labelled, as clients. Specifically, they made the following observations: 1) expectations for nurturance and reliable, continual support by the interveners conflicted with the paternal authority, the controlling, punishing figures who judged the worthiness of the refugees; 2) refugees were categorized with an impersonal quality, like property; 3) institutions interested in absorbing or rehabilitating refugees imposed an organization of relevant facts, needs and goals in a way that the institutional structures could handle them; 4) the absorption of refugees depended on the outcome of an interplay between their desires and expectations and the extent to which they could meet the demands of the organizations controlling them; 5) refugees' knowledge of their 'problem' was designated as subjective, biased, and uninformed; and 6) refugees cannot effect their own release from their situation—only others can (de Voe, 1981:90-91; Zetter, 1985:437-448). Thus, the very process of labelling previously described in general terms has been observed in the two recent independent evaluations of refugee assistance programmes.

DOING MORE. OR LESS? BETTER!

Realisation of the critical juncture concerning the present status of refugees and assistance programmes in Africa has spurred several attempts to understand better the issues and to develop strategies for change. Despite proclamations about the essential nature of input from refugees, it was not until the International Symposium on 'Assistance to Refugees: Alternative Viewpoints' at Oxford in 1984 that refugees were allowed to publicly express their perspectives. A central issue raised was the need for assistance programmes at all levels to avoid being 'operative' by recognizing the existing strengths and know-how of refugees themselves and of host country governments, by consulting, and by being cooperative through helping refugees and local governments being operative themselves. That is, to develop and act on a conceptualization of the energy and power of refugees to help themselves, where assistance means co-ordinating and responding to refugees' expressed needs (Harrell-Bond and Karadawi, 1984). The Symposium's participants recommended that refugees and refugee communities be enabled to become economically self-reliant as quickly as possible, that greater emphasis be placed on allowing refugees and refugee organizations to administer development funds and projects, that refugee representatives receive orientation and training that will enable them to perform their duties in an effective and efficient manner, that refugee organizations engaged in humanitarian work be given NGO status, that refugees be provided full and accurate information regarding the activities of all agencies involved, that refugee
participation be an integral component in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects and, finally, that independent research into refugee issues be facilitated and supported - including the training of refugee researchers (Assistance to Refugees: Alternative Viewpoints, 1984).

A meeting of institutions involved in assisting refugees in southern Sudan (Sudanese Commission for Refugees, UNHCR and NGOs) was held in mid-1985 in Kassala, the Sudan (Commission for Refugees, 1985). Self-criticism by these organizations produced these characterizations of their work: suspicion and negative competition, slow responses to urgent problems, unclear lines of authority, inadequate information and feedback, a lack of confidence in national institutions and in local expertise, inability of agencies to freely express their opinions and lack of flexibility and compromise in planning and implementation. Proposed solutions centered on the need to decentralize decision-making, develop better systems of information gathering and processing, in-service training and clarify job descriptions and lines of authority.

Unfortunately, the recommendations failed to address several key institutional issues. First, they indicate the inability to understand the motivations and consequences of the inter-agency competition for control over projects and resources and/or the unwillingness to attempt to resolve it. The proposed standardization of salaries and the establishment of a 'tripartite recreation centre' do not address the issue. Second, standardization of salaries is also expected to solve the ignorance and distrust of national institutions and local expertise by agency personnel. The underlying issues of ideology and power are ignored. Similarly, there is no clear indication of why, what or how local information should be gathered concerning refugees and the local population. Fourth, no serious recognition was given to the issue of why or how decision-making authority should be decentralized. Finally, the issue of how to best facilitate refugees' self-reliance was not covered at all in the discussion of problems.

This last issue was the focus of the ICVA/UNHCR 'Workshop on Development Approaches to Refugee Situations' held in late 1985 at Cret-Berard (Zollner, 1986). That dependency may be perpetuated by the very programmes which assistance is expected to alleviate has been widely deduced. Initial solutions proposed and implemented by assistance programme administrators have included reducing food rations and refugees 'engaging in productive work rather than languishing from inactivity' (Gorman, 1985:92). In considerable detail, on the other hand, Harrell-Bond (1985; 1986) has raised a series of fundamental questions which negate the plausibility of such behavioral modification techniques in assisting refugees self-help efforts toward development.

The recommendations of the Workshop are encouraging, but must be viewed in the context elaborated in this paper. Problems identified were those of refugees' dependency, inherent problems with organized camps and their limited mobility to pursue economic activities, existing limitations of economic opportunities for both refugees and the local population, and the cooperation of the agencies involved. The workshop participants expressed the view that 'prolonged care and maintenance programmes can exacerbate the gap between the refugees and the local population and can create a false expectation of assistance and cause (emphasis added) inertia and a lack of initiative on the part of the refugees.' The earlier discussion on labelling leads to an alternative conclusion. It is the present nature of assistance programmes- not merely those of a prolonged and maintenance character- which create the so-called dependency syndrome through an active process of usurping people's initiative. Further, recognition that refugees would perhaps fare better outside of organized settlements conflicts with the
administrative 'need' to observe, monitor and control.

Greater sensitivity of the agencies concerning the need for refugees to be integrally involved in needs assessments was evident. A frequently ignored prerequisite of success with such efforts is that this integration be a process of communication in which solutions are worked out on an iterative basis. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which economic activities established among refugees can benefit from more in-depth investigation of the systems operating among the local host population: this concerns agriculture, livestock raising, wage labor and starting businesses. Finally, the agencies saw the importance of refugees approval for proposed projects as being 'important' and having 'merit', but they do not yet have an understanding of how refugees need to initiate requests for projects which are perceived as 'integrated' and 'best'. In other words, no underlying behavioural model and assumptions about refugees are elaborated as a first step to developing solutions for the present impasse.

The issue of decentralization has been in fashion in academic and administrative circles in the last decade. The basic issues involved are those of linked changes in control over policy making, personnel and finances; limited impact will occur if corresponding changes do not occur in all functional areas (Conyers, 1986:94). Further, changes must be made at all levels of action. Conyers concludes that decentralization is inevitably a political issue because it is about the distribution of power. Thus, the very concept of 'designing' decentralization connotes a top-down approach (Conyers, 1986:91,93). As Gorman (1986:294-5) observes:

While decisions about project finance and implementation to a large extent have been left to individual donor and host government interaction, decentralization has not meant that the key beneficiaries, the refugees and host country nationals living in refugee-affected areas have been adequately consulted. Indeed, the whole ICARA II process has been dominated by government decision-making with only token attention given to the view of people in refugee-affected areas.

Particularly important is to recognize that decentralization is a process of change, partly because decentralization can itself create new problems, partly because individuals and organizations seldom relinquish power willingly, and partly because the objectives which decentralization is supposed to achieve - e.g., popular initiative - have not yet been seriously explored (Conyers, 1986:96-97). To date, little success in effectively decentralizing has been achieved.

CONCLUSION

A new conceptual approach is appropriate, one that has indeed epistemological and ideological dimensions. It is necessary to view individuals, local communities and refugees as the locus of the essential, non-material 'resources' needed for development, as well as the locus of the articulation of 'problems' and 'needs' (Butcher, 1986:111). Too often such basic facts as the managing skills of people - even those statically labelled 'refugees' - are ignored with damaging consequences (Calavan, 1984:217). The UNHCR and other aid donors must learn about the background and dynamic nature of the refugee groups before offering 'assistance' (Karadawi, 1983:543-546; Calavan, 1984:217).

We must learn to go beyond the positivist tendencies which predominate in our epistemology in everyday lives, in social science research and in administration and management (Madut, 1985). Information gathering with preconceived ideas, approaches, or even 'questionnaires' does 'violence' to people's meaning systems (Howes and Chambers, 1979:7). Appropriate methods of learning about development for the people involved might utilize
the 'education through problem posing' methods initiated by Paulo
Freire in which the discussions are designed to locate solutions
which lay within the grasp of the people themselves (Howes,
1979:20). Another method used with increasing success is
community theatre (George, 1984). Finally, for people and those
expecting to 'assist', video as a means of perceiving differently
is being explored (Litwin, 1984).

Policy-making and administration are unlikely to exist in a
non-labelling society, despite Wood's (1985:369) aspiration.
There will be struggles over whose definitions and labels
prevail. As Zetter (1985:446) elaborated, we can strive for
interaction and programmes which avoid stereotyping, rely on
genuinely participatory methods, and are more responsive to
particular needs and which avoid filtering and segregating some
needs from the totality. Labels and patterned interaction are not
immutable. They are not likely to be changed to the advantage of
the relatively powerless, however, without collective effort.
Nonconformity may contribute to alternative, de-
institutionalized forms of resource access and development.

This would be firmer evidence of the re-location of power and
initiative, of de-professionalization, of a breakdown of
monopolies of knowledge, pseudo-skills and information, of a
genuine participation (on the ground floor) through the
negotiation of agendas and rules. The relationships involved
in such negotiations would be de-bureaucratized and
political, not de-politicized and bureaucratic (Wood,
1985:369 emphasis added).

A truly professional approach by agency staff will necessitate not
only appropriate training and experience in specific techniques
but utilizing methods of learning and doing that truly accomplish
the objectives of supporting refugee initiative, self-reliance
and growth (Harrell-Bond and Karadawi, 1984:256; Karadawi,

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