Thailand has hosted refugees from Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Burma for more than 20 years. While refugees from Indochina have remained the dominant caseload, a continual influx of refugees from Burma, particularly since 1988, has demanded an increasing degree of attention from the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and international humanitarian organisations. In contrast to the Indochinese refugee caseload, the RTG has refused to authorise the official presence on the Burma border of the usual `protector of refugees', UNHCR.
As a consequence, the refugees have been denied the international protection and assistance to which they are entitled under the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees [1]. By 1996, the Burma border caseload had grown to 98,000 refugees living in more than 25 refugee camps and includes three major ethnic groups spread along the 1,500 kilometre Thailand/Burma border: the Mon in the south, the Karen in the central and the Karenni in the north. In the enforced absence of UNHCR, in 1984 a consortium of NGOs, the Burmese Border Consortium, was invited by the RTG to provide temporary emergency relief assistance to 9,000 ethnic minority refugees from Burma.
A positive result of the assistance structure has been that a lowcost, effective and nonintrusive programme has been developed between the NGOs and the refugee communities. In addition, however, the responsibility of ensuring the protection of these refugees has fallen to the NGOs, who have neither the authority nor the power to secure it. While the RTG has allowed UNHCR limited access to the refugee camps, UNHCR must first apply for special passes which take a minimum of two weeks to process, often issued after the initial emergency has subsided.
The NGOs, both individually and through the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT)[2], have approached UNHCR to urge action in light of the protection needs of refugees on the Thailand/Burma border. Although UNHCR remains constrained by the RTG, there are inherent mandate issues which are its responsibility to address. UNHCR could have facilitated, and now should facilitate, discreet activities to which the Thai authorities would probably not object. Unfortunately UNHCR has shown little initiative in the field to exercise its mandate to protect refugees or to implement activities which would strengthen the NGOs' ability to provide some level of protection. UNHCR cannot address the protection needs of refugees in repatriation sites or refugee camps to which UNHCR does not have regular access, without the assistance and collaboration of the NGOs who are authorised by the RTG to provide services there.
Current situation
The refugee population exploded after 1988 when the Burmese government crushed peaceful prodemocracy demonstrations throughout the country. The Burmese junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), then attempted to regain control of the border states where many political activists and students sought asylum with the ethnic groups who had been struggling for selfdetermination since the midtwentieth century. SLORC has waged an ongoing offensive against the ethnic populations which has resulted in a steady increase in the number of new refugees: 1992 68,000; 1993 72,000; 1994 77,000; 1995 92,000; June 1996 98,000. The ethnic groups have come under increasing pressure from SLORC to sign ceasefire agreements, while SLORC pursues a campaign of forced labour, mass relocations and other human rights abuses.
The Mon refugee camps in the south were considered by the Burmese and Thai governments as a hindrance and disruptive to the economic viability of the area (ie the gas pipeline currently under construction and logging concessions). As a consequence, the Mon leadership was put under tremendous pressure to sign a ceasefire agreement and to relocate the refugees to designated sites across the border in Burma [3]. This relocation was completed between October 1995 and April 1996 in the absence of a political settlement with SLORC and without any international agreement providing for voluntary return, monitoring or relief and reintegration assistance. At the same time, new Mon refugees were still arriving in Thailand, fleeing human rights abuses in Burma.
UNHCR guidelines on voluntary repatriation and protection
The arrival in May 1996 of the newly published UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection (referred to henceforth as The Handbook) was received with much interest. The Handbook is particularly relevant to the concerns addressed by CCSDPT and the possibility that repatriation (forced or other) will continue to be on the Burma caseload agenda. The Handbook consists of guidelines which have clearly not been followed in the case of the Mon refugees. It also poignantly indicates how UNHCR has failed to protect other refugees from Burma in Thailand, by highlighting activities which it has not facilitated.
There has been little effort by UNHCR to provide the various refugee groups with guidance on protection and repatriation issues. Even though the Mon National Relief Committee has requested several times that UNHCR assist them in implementing a repatriation which is in line with international standards and is monitored by an international observer, UNHCR claims that early communication from the Mon leadership indicated the `voluntariness' of the move and that it was unable to fulfil their request. To date, there has been no attempt by UNHCR to monitor or do followup with the group after their return to Burma. Now UNHCRThailand says that the Mon are no longer their concern since they have returned to Burma. However, according to The Handbook, a cessation of refugee status is not automatic upon repatriation.
"A mere possibly transitory change in the facts surrounding the individual refugee's fear of persecution, which does not amount to a fundamental change of circumstances, is not sufficient to make this clause applicable. A refugee's status should not in principle be subject to frequent review to the detriment of his or her sense of security, which international protection is intended to provide." (p 9)
According to The Handbook, UNHCR should address safety issues en route to the new sites (p 12). However, UNHCR did not even question the refugees in order to assess the physical safety issues or constraints of their journey. The NGOs do not know whether UNHCR approached the RTG with any concerns with regard to the movement of a large group of what UNHCR officially views as 'prima facie refugees'. Furthermore, it is unclear whether UNHCR assessed the durability of the 'repatriation'. Rather, UNHCR seems to have used its lack of mandate by the RTG in order not to engage in simple protection activities. The 'essential preconditions' (p 16) to be met before UNHCR will promote or support voluntary repatriation movements did not exist before the Mon relocated back across the border, yet UNHCR did not object to the movement.
It also remains unclear what UNHCR has done with regard to persuading SLORC to allow UNHCR a presence in the areas of return. It appears that this proposition was rejected by SLORC until the conclusion of the Rohingya repatriation programme [4]. However, there is no end in sight to that massive undertaking and, in the meantime, the repatriated Mon remain isolated and without access to international monitoring. Nor has UNHCR coordinated with or consulted the NGOs in a substantive manner on setting up systems under which a proper international response could be organised.
The Handbook assumes that refugees are aware of their right to be protected. However, there is no access to such information in the isolated jungle areas where the refugee camps are located, nor in the rural mountainous areas from which they came. Infrequent high profile visits by UNHCR to the refugee camps do not constitute an adequate attempt to "promote the principles and objectives of international humanitarian and human rights law, and to ensure humanitarian access". (p 30)
UNHCR's contact with the ethnic minority refugee groups along the Thailand/Burma border is infrequent and often only at the request of the NGOs and in reaction to a crisis. According to The Handbook:
"UNHCR should, to the extent possible, keep channels of communication open with all parties to the conflict pertaining to a refugee situation in order to be able to work actively towards creating conditions conducive for return rather than waiting passively for conditions to change so that refugees can volunteer to return." (p 30)
Educating and informing refugees about what rights they have is an implicit task of UNHCR. If constrained from doing so, UNHCR should provide guidance to the NGOs to facilitate this effort.
In some cases, UNHCR hindered contact between NGOs and high level delegations even though the NGOs are in regular contact with the refugees concerned and therefore have better access to information. Preventing NGOs from meeting UN delegations could be construed as blocking information on which decisions favourable to the refugees could be made.
NGOs are infrequently mentioned in The Handbook even though they have become an integral part of service and protection structures in most refugee situations. In the manual's 178 pages, UNHCR dedicates only two pages to issues of NGO coordination, in a two page chapter entitled 'Interagency and NGO Cooperation' (p 107).
UNHCRThailand seems unaware of how to begin to engage in a partnership with the NGOs, particularly with those with whom it does not have a donor relationship. This is of course an initiative that requires commitment from both NGOs and UNHCR. During the High Commissioner's keynote address at the opening ceremony of the 1994 PARinAC Global Conference [5], she committed UNHCR to a coordination process while admitting that it would not be an easy task for either UNHCR or NGOs:
"Our recommendations should have a positive impact on our relationship, and contribute to the achievement of our common goal of providing viable solutions... It will require substantive efforts by both UNHCR and NGOs, including changes in both thinking and approach, and a willingness on both sides to meet our respective responsibilities."
During the two years since the PARinAC conference conclusions, the UNHCR/NGO coordination and partnership effort has not been successful in Thailand. It is vital, however, that the effort to coordinate is not abandoned. Since it is unlikely that the RTG will allow UNHCR unfettered access to the refugee camps along its western border and equally unlikely that SLORC will authorise access to the Burma/Thailand border through UNHCR's official delegation in Rangoon, working with NGOs is the most viable alternative. The NGOs are clear that UNHCR is an integral player in the provision of protection for refugees and so call upon UNHCR to acknowledge its responsibility and to play an active leadership role in protection issues.
Recommendations
At the request of CCSDPT, UNHCR has agreed to establish a working group of UNHCR/NGO participants to identify strategies which could strengthen UNHCR's ability to implement its protection mandate [6]. Below are some recommendations for improving protection for refugees from Burma for UNHCR and NGOs to consider:
NGOs should ensure that they are fully informed about UNHCR's mandate and should approach UNHCR with constructive proposals relating to those areas which they feel need to be strengthened. The proposals should be well thought out, practical and able to be implemented given the reality of UNHCR's lack of authorisation by Thailand and its sensitive relationship with SLORC.
UNHCR and the NGOs must build a relationship based on trust and cooperation. This effort may include asking each other for clarification on information and its sources and/or discussing why the information may be considered confidential.
The UNHCR/NGO Working Group in Thailand should meet monthly until some activities have been accomplished, after which less frequent meetings should continue to facilitate the collaboration effort.
UNHCR should work with the NGOs in setting up realistic, low profile activities to improve UNHCR's access to the refugee groups and to information available on the border.
UNHCR should help the NGOs improve their protection role in the absence of UNHCR. Manuals such as The Handbook and other UNHCR materials could be useful tools; simple distribution of manuals is not enough.
UNHCR should work with the NGOs to assess other basic protection criteria and to improve strategies of service implementation which will take into account methods for ensuring that vulnerable groups are provided with adequate access to services and protection (ie women, single heads of household, unaccompanied minors, the disabled, etc).
The Working Group should identify ways to improve communication between UNHCR and the NGOs, entailing substantive consultation, not just an exchange of information.
The Working Group should identify appropriate, discreet ways for the NGOs and embassies to convey to the RTG their support for UNHCR's efforts to increase protection activities with refugees on the border.
UNHCR should discuss with NGOs the concept of Quick Impact Projects and what options there may be for those refugees who plan to repatriate or who have already repatriated to Burma (ie the Mon).
UNHCR and NGOs should agree to disagree when necessary so as not to get bogged down in what may seem like irresolvable issues.
The need to coordinate is high priority for both the NGOs and UNHCR and should be given adequate time and attention. The result will be an increased level of protection for refugees: a shared objective.
Jennie McCann is a former Ford Foundation Fellow at RSP. While working as director of a humanitarian assistance programme in Thailand (19921996), she also served as chairperson of CCSDPT from June 1995 to June 1996.
Notes
1. Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees but has upheld the standards of the Convention in the Indochinese refugee caseloads.
2. CCSDPT was established at the urging of the RTG Ministry of the Interior in 1975 as the official NGO coordinating body for all agencies authorised by the RTG to implement programmes with refugees in Thailand.
3. Mon refugees moved to resettlement sites which are in Burma but still in close proximity to the Thailand border. No Mon refugees have actually repatriated to their preflight residence; hence the movement is actually a
relocation of refugee camps.
4. Since 1992 UNHCR has been facilitating the repatriation of 250,000 ethnic Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh back to Arakan state, Burma.
5. Partnership in Action (PARinAC) is a consultation process initiated by UNHCR and International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) to identify strategies to strengthen coordination between NGOs and UNHCR and was concluded at a conference in Oslo in June, 1994. The conclusions were supposed to be the subsequent guidelines for UNHCR and NGOs to strengthen their working relationship.
6. The first UNHCR/NGO Working Group met in June 1996; NGO participants were disappointed that it was used purely for exchange of information. The second meeting was scheduled for August.
October 1996