A recurrent issue in refugee protection is the increase in insecurity in the areas they inhabit. 'Physical protection of refugees and displaced persons in camps can be problematic even in `normal' circumstances' [1]. In East Africa, the increase in crime is playing a paramount role in determining the response of the host states.
Both Kenya and Tanzania, the major host states in the region, have responded to the deterioration in security by closing borders, calling for forcible repatriation and threatening, or actually, expelling refugees. While the concerns of states may be legitimate, the measures taken in response are unfair and illegal.
They are unfair because often deterioration in camp security is a result of the failure of UNHCR and the host states to disarm refugees and the concentrating of refugees in camps. Both contribute to increased criminality; camps allow refugees to regroup, train and attempt to launch attacks on the country of origin from the camps.
They are illegal because they contravene provisions of refugee law regarding the right to seek asylum and nonrefoulement. The solution to security problems is to make sure all refugees are disarmed upon admission into the host country and to ensure as much as possible that refugees are not concentrated in one place, especially in border regions. The international community must cooperate with host states to ensure that these measures are achieved.
The pattern of refugee movement and settlement
Forced migration in East Africa exhibits certain peculiar features which have implications for security and physical protection of refugees. First, refugees seek protection in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. At the end of 1995, Kenya hosted approximately 225,000 refugees (including some 170,000 from Somalia and 40,000 from Sudan); Tanzania hosted slightly more than 700,000 refugees (including some 500,000 from Rwanda, 180,000 from Burundi and 15,000 from Zaire); and Uganda hosted some 230,00 refugees (including approximately 210,000 from Sudan, 15,000 from Zaire and 5,000 from Rwanda).
Under the OAU Convention on Refugees, to which all these East African countries are party, grant of asylum to refugees is supposed to be a peaceful and humanitarian act, not to be regarded as an unfriendly act by any member State [2]. In reality, granting asylum to refugees is resented by both host states and countries of origin and this has implications for security and the physical protection of refugees.
Refugees in East Africa are usually settled in large camps a short distance from the border. These refugees come from war situations where weapons are readily available. Most refugees from Rwanda, for example, arrived en masse which made it difficult for Tanzania to disarm or settle them in a manner that took account of security considerations.
According to the Lawyers Committee Report, the deployment of international forces in Somalia in Operation Restore Hope (subsequently UNOSOM) had the effect of driving armed Somalians into the border areas and, subsequently, Kenyan refugee settlements; Kenyan security personnel, relief workers and supplies have all been victims of attacks: 'A particular problem has been the high incidence of rape among refugee women, often coupled with extortion.'[3] In January 1993, at least 18 people, including several Kenyan guards, were killed in crossborder raids when armed men attacked refugee camps in search of food and vehicles.
In Tanzania, the influx of Rwandese refugees after the 1994 genocide caused great insecurity and instability in the border areas, particularly in Karagwe and Ngara districts. Within one year, Tanzania's hospitality to refugees had left over 70 innocent Tanzanians killed by refugees, and 2,500 livestock and other property worth more than 150 million shillings stolen in Kagera region alone. In addition, the presence of the refugees caused tension in the relations between Tanzania and Burundi and, to a certain extent, Rwanda. Its new government suspected that the refugees were regrouping and training to attack their country of origin, a suspicion which was not wholly unfounded [4].
As a refugeeproducing and host country, Uganda has had an even more complicated experience with the security consequences of forced migration. Throughout the eight years of Amin's rule, the country went to war with Tanzania a number of times, several times triggered by attacks by Ugandan refugees from Tanzanian soil. These wars led to severe casualties on both sides and to a situation of perpetual hostility between Tanzania and Uganda which did not abate until Yoweri Museveni came to power.
During Museveni's presidency, it was Uganda's turn to become the base for refugees attempting voluntary repatriation by force. In October 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda. The manoeuvres soon proved catastrophic for the residents of Kabaare in Uganda who suffered serious socioeconomic upheaval over the following four years: 'Commerce was disrupted with the closure of the border, property destroyed and many people were forced to flee from the cool highland district as Rwanda Defence Forces (of mainly Hutus) shelled rebel RPF positions.'[5] The invasion led to a state of hostility between Rwanda and Uganda and transformed Rwanda's civilethnic war into a regional security issue.
Implications for refugee protection
The first and ultimate casualty of wrong policies is the legal and physical protection of all refugees. At various times, East African countries have responded with border closures to prevent further influx of refugees, threats to expel and calls for repatriation of refugees, regardless of conditions in the countries of origin. In January 1993, after a series of armed attacks, the Kenyan Government asked the UNHCR to repatriate all of its Somali, Ethiopian and Sudanese refugees in the country, arguing that the number of refugees had seriously compromised the security of the country. A similar call has been made more recently by Members of the Kenyan Parliament from both the ruling party KANU and the opposition, following acts of banditry and violence in refugee camps in Northern Kenya.
Internal and external insecurity was one of the main reasons which led Tanzania to close its border with Rwanda and Burundi. Despite repeated appeals by the international community (and occasional relaxation of its stance), Tanzania has maintained its position and there are reports that some refugees who were turned back at the Tanzanian border have been killed upon return to Burundi.
Insecurity in camps has also caused NGOs to reduce the number of their staff or completely halt their aid programmes to refugees. In May 1993, Medecins sans Frontieres (Belgium) withdrew most of its women workers from camps in northeastern Kenya after reports of a high incidence of assaults on refugees and aid workers. Aid workers in northern Uganda have been subjected to a series of assaults including abductions and robbery; as a consequence, Oxfam, the largest NGO operating there, recently decided to withdraw staff. The existence of criminals in refugee camps does pose a moral dilemma for humanitarians. Many organisations battle with their consciences over whether to assist camps accommodating criminals or to refuse aid to such refugee groups. There is evidence also that aid given to refugees has been converted by criminal fugitives among them for buying arms to continue subversive activities.
Certain donors have decided not to extend aid to refugees in camps when there is the slightest evidence they are being used as recruiting and training grounds for militia. In one case, the Lutheran World Federation had to use its reserve funds to maintain its assistance operations in northern Kenya; donors withheld money after a journalist reported that the camps were being used for military training, despite LWF's assurance (based on evidence) that they were not.
Appraisal of host government and donor reactions
Host governments and donors are rightly concerned with the internal and external insecurity caused by large influxes of refugees in host countries. However, it is not fair to blame refugees only and take punitive measures against them. As noted, the insecurity in such situations is very much a result of the policy of placing refugees in large camps located on borders. The camp setting facilitates infiltration by criminal elements, makes refugees, aid workers and aid supplies easy targets, and facilitates military recruitment and training of refugees within camps. The location of camps along borders encourages crossborder raids as well as the use of camps by fighters for 'Rest & Recuperation'.
It is also unfair for host governments to take restrictive measures against all refugees or for NGOs to withdraw aid because of the presence of criminals in camps; the overwhelming majority of refugees are innocent and law abiding persons. It is as wrong to impose collective sanction on all refugees simply because there are criminals among them as it would be to punish an entire village simply because there were some criminals living there who could not be identified. Imposition of collective punishment is contrary to a well respected principle of justice that it is better to let one criminal free than to punish ninetynine innocent persons.
The problems of criminality in refugee camps is often a result of members of the host population who exploit the presence of refugees to increase their criminal activities. Criminality on the part of refugees may also be a function of their complete destitution and lack of gainful employment, the result of confinement in camps.
Confining refugees in camps is unlawful as it denies them freedom of movement; as such, it violates Article 26 of the UN Refugee Convention. Moreover, freedom of movement is typically a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other refugee rights such as employment, education, association, etc, which are also guaranteed by refugee and human rights instruments.
Recommendations
As argued above, the problem of security has as much to do with the policies and practices of protection as with criminal elements among refugees themselves. Therefore, the first step in addressing this problem is to rethink these policies and practices.
1. In order to minimise problems of international security, host states
should implement Art II(6) which provides that: 'For reasons of security,
countries of asylum shall, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin.' This will minimise, if not prevent, crossborder raids into refugee camps. It will also make it difficult for camps to be used as a base for launching attacks (on their country of origin), thus removing the possibility of potential interstate conflict.
2. Host states should also refrain from providing bases from which refugees could launch attacks on their country of origin. Such attacks, which in many instances have the tacit and even military support of the host state, violate basic norms designed to ensure stability in relations between states.
3. To address internal security, host countries should disarm refugees and, wherever possible, avoid putting refugees in camps. Where this is not possible, host countries should endeavour to ensure that refugee camps are small enough to be properly and securely managed.
4. Donors should not withdraw aid simply because it may benefit criminal and armed elements or because of security threats to relief agency staff. Instead, they should seek alternative means of increasing security for their staff and property.
Implementation of the above recommendations will require human, financial and technical resources which the East African countries do not have. Therefore, if these countries are to implement the recommendations, they must receive assistance. The issue of the incongruity between the physical protection duty of host states in Africa and their lack of capacity to discharge it was discussed by the Symposium on Refugee Protection in Africa which made the following recommendation:
The international community, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other relevant organisations, should support and assist host governments in fulfilling their responsibilities towards refugees in a manner consistent with the principles of refugee law on the one hand, and legitimate national security, social and economic interests on the other hand. In particular, financial, material and technical assistance should be made available to:
(iv) enable Governments to respond effectively to situations which may contribute to a deterioration in security, law and order in the refugee hosting areas. In this regard, priority should be placed on isolating and disarming individuals or groups among the refugee populations who may be armed and threatening the lives of innocent refugees, local citizens, and humanitarian personnel, or engaging in other criminal acts.
Further to the preceding recommendation, to trace and impound for safe custody or destruction, dangerous weapons illegally circulating or hidden in refugee hosting areas. [6]
This matter was also addressed by the joint evaluation of emergency assistance to Rwanda, which recommended:
In situations where the international community has assumed humanitarian responsibility at refugee and/or IDP camps, the following action with respect to camp security measures should be taken:
a) Give UN peace missions authority and appropriate means to ensure protection, in coordination with host governments or otherwise, of camp populations and staff of relief organisations.
b) Work with host governments to take other measures, such as disarming camp
residents, separating genuine refugees from those not entitled to refugee status, barring arms trading, preventing military training of residents, expelling hostile leadership from camps, halting the operations of hate media, and splitting up large camps into smaller ones at a greater distance from the border.
c) Advise official and nongovernmental agency staff on prudent patterns of behaviour that will not invite security problems as well as on how effectively to maintain an open and continuous dialogue with the beneficiary community. [7]
This is a sound and comprehensive recommendation which, however, ought not to be limited to camps receiving international humanitarian assistance. The UN should extend assistance whenever asked to do so by host countries, particularly in situations of mass influx of refugees from war.
Similar proposals were made more recently by the United States at the Rwanda Round Table in Geneva where Mr MacCall, Chief of Staff of the US Agency for International Development stated that his country considered that the solution to insecurity in camps lay in closing camps in unstable regions and repatriating their occupants voluntarily or relocating them to smaller camps further away from the border [8].
Implementation of the above proposals is essential for the safety and wellbeing of refugees, aid workers and host states. Anything that needs to be done to ensure that host states are able to continue to provide protection and security must be seen as a joint responsibility of the international community.
Bonaventure Rutinwa is Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, and Coordinator of the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, Dar es Salaam.
1. Relief and Rehabilitation Network (16), 'The Joint Evaluation of the Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Study III Principal Findings and Recommendations', ODI, June 1996:26.
2. OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969, Article II(2).
3. African Exodus: Refugee Crisis, Human Rights and the 1969 OAU Convention, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, June 1995:64.
4. Rutinwa B 'Tanzania's response to the Rwanda emergency' in Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol 9, No 3, 1996 (forthcoming). See abstracts on p .. of this RPN.
5. Special correspondent 'Museveni attacked over Rwanda', The East African Chronicle, week ending 3 May 1996, p5.
6. OkothObbo G 'The Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa', reproduced in IJRL, special issue July 1995:300.
7. Erikson J et al The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, Synthesis Report, p56.
8. MacCall R US Statement at the Rwanda Round Table, 2021 June 1996, Geneva, p4.
October 1996