RPN 22 published October1996

7. Displaced and dispossessed: Peruns internally displaced face hardship and insecurity whether they return or not by Sean Loughna

Although the ndirtyn war which ravaged Peru during the 1980s and early 1990s is largely regarded as over, the social and economic conditions that contributed to the emergence of conflict are now even more pressing than ever. By not adequately addressing the endemic poverty and discrimination that Peruns internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees face, the Government of Peru runs the risk of provoking a resurgence in violence. The government is not only failing to provide socioeconomic security for these people but is also jeopardising their physical wellbeing. In his report published in January 1996, the Representative of the SecretaryGeneral of the UN, Francis Deng, highlights protection and assistance for Peruns IDPs as a priority for government action [1].

Fifteen years of war between revolutionary armed opposition groups, principally Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the military and security forces, have taken their toll mainly on the civilian population. A Maoist party emerging from the countryns remote and poorest regions, Sendero alienated most of its potential support by its indiscriminate attacks against the rural population which it claimed to be representing. The government largely failed to intervene and protect these marginal sectors of society. When the military response did come, it was equally ferocious in its violence against civilians. These people were seen as legitimate targets by both sides in the conflict. Massacres, by Sendero and by the security forces, of entire communities who refused to take sides in the conflict are well documented.

An estimated 27,000 Peruvians died in the violence and almost a million people were internally displaced, of whom at least 600,000 remain so. The vast majority of the IDPs are rural peasants who took refuge in the towns and cities.

Return or remain?

The weakening of Sendero since their leaderns capture in 1992 and the resulting improvement in the security situation, combined with the intolerable living conditions in some receiving cities, have encouraged people to return to their places of origin. In addition, the government has tried to encourage the return process by offering assistance to those who go back, while offering nothing to those who remain. IDPs most willing to return are those closer to their homes and more recently displaced. According to government estimates, about 200,000 to 300,000 of Peruns IDPs will remain where they are; others believe the figure will be higher. Reasons for deciding to remain include poor education, lack of fertile land and the extent of poverty, neglect and hopelessness of rural life. By fleeing, many have lost what little land they did have. At least in urban areas there is work to be found, however poorly paid it might be. In addition, despite government rhetoric to the contrary, the political violence has not completely ceased, with attacks on the civilian population continuing in the highland regions of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Apurímac, the central jungle areas and the Alto Huallaga.

The internally displaced in Peru are the poorest of the poor. In some displaced indigenous communities, as much as 80% of the population suffers from malnutrition. The greater availability and selection of foods in urban centres are another reason for many displaced families not wanting to return. During the 1980s, there was a negative growth in GDP, increasing unemployment and underemployment. The government has taken a hardline approach in trying to cut inflation and resolve the countryns debt crisis. Women suffer particularly from marginalisation and discrimination, as well as from domestic violence which, with escalating unemployment and male alcoholism, is worse than ever. The systematic use of violence against women by both sides in the conflict has reduced but not ceased; according to Dengns report, displaced women continue to be exposed to sexual abuse and aggression and in some areas women working in the fields still face significant security risks. Others particularly at risk are indigenous people, human rights activists, union members and displaced community leaders.

Pressure from the security forces to return home is being applied to some communities, despite precarious security conditions and unsuitable living conditions. There have been allegations that in some cases this pressure is being applied in order to monitor the reaction of the armed opposition groups. Returnees are often resented by members of the community who did not flee; those who remained see themselves as having endured more by staying and yet are often not provided with the assistance that the returning community receives.

Human rights abuses by the government

The governmentns draconian antiterrorist measures have resulted in numerous complaints of human rights abuses. Many IDPs are being held arbitrarily and for prolonged periods in prisons, either waiting to be charged or awaiting trail on terrorist charges. However, many of these detainees are eventually released due to lack of evidence or because their detention was the result of an administrative error. As a result of the conflict, many people, especially IDPs who fled for their lives, have no personal identification papers. Persons lacking this documentation are immediately under suspicion and males among them are subject to conscription. In rural areas there is a dearth of legal representatives who are able to protect the rights of the impoverished majority.

Support for returnees

According to the governmentsponsored agency responsible for aid to the displaced, Proyecto de Apoyo a la Repoblación (PAR Project of Support to the Repopulation), 250,000 displaced persons (41%) have returned; 140,000 through organised, governmentassisted programmes and 110,000 spontaneously. On the other hand, members of the nongovernmental Mesas sobre Desplazamiento have claimed that only some 20% (120,000) have returned and no more than another 10% are likely to do so. The Mesas sobre Desplazamiento (hereafter Mesas) are working groups on the displaced, at national and regional level, and include grassroots organisations of displaced communities, church groups, local and international NGOs, representatives of international organisations and, occasionally, government representatives.

But now the rural communities have needs beyond basic protection from violent attack. Insufficient agricultural production by returnee farmers has rendered them unable to support themselves and their families and has resulted in them leaving their homes once more. A whole package of social and economic assistance is required, including health and education, without which returnee families are likely to leave again for the towns and cities. This assistance needs to be long term, not restricted to a few days or weeks as is currently often the case.

PAR has been criticised for not consulting with displaced persons, NGOs or

church groups working with the displaced and returnees. The authorities have little knowledge or understanding of rural areas and this has led to them providing inappropriate assistance as well as being seen to be working with the nwrong siden, causing resentment. It is crucial that the government identify who the most needy are and what it is they lack.

Assistance programmes are not tailored to specific needs but designed on a national scale. As a result, people receive food which they do not know how to prepare and tools unsuitable for the land which they are working. Many of the governmentns assistance programmes place too much emphasis on infrastructure; new roads are of little use if the price of produce in the area is too low or if there is no access to credit or technology.

The IOM conducted studies in Peru during 1994 and 1995, devising a list of components necessary for a return project to be successful and to prevent further displacement. The list of recommendations included conducting an official evaluation prior to reintegration to assess the minimum conditions required for selfsustenance and selfprotection; the possibility of detecting imminent conflicts; the demilitarisation of civilian security forces; and the establishment of democratic institutions for the resolution of conflict.

The role of UNHCR and other international agencies

Since 1991, UNHCR has explored possibilities of prevention of displacement in Peru but has not become directly involved because of the limitations of its mandate. It also considers itself unable to add substantively to the humanitarian efforts of other UN agencies active in the country. These other activities include UNDP support for government programmes including PAR, as well as direct assistance for various poor communities (IDPs and returnees among them), and WFP assistance for governmental and non governmental relief efforts. In addition, UNICEF runs a variety of food, health and education programmes for orphaned and displaced minors. The ICRC has played a crucial role throughout the conflict in protecting displaced people, which included providing emergency food assistance when no other agency was able to.

The role of the Self-Defence Committees and organisations of displaced persons

The civilian Comités de Autodefensa Civil (CACs SelfDefence Committees) are generally credited with playing the larger part in defeating Sendero, although they have received no compensation or official recognition for their crucial role. Their presence in rural areas has provided the security for families to return. However, allegations of human rights abuses levelled at them in the earlier years of the conflict have continued, though at an abated rate. CACs often demand that returnees seek their permission to return, may insist that a fee is paid or may even prevent them from returning. Increasingly, they are arming themselves to protect their communities, leading to an increasing potential for violent confrontation, both within and between communities. On the other hand, the Statens moves to decommission arms from the CACs have been criticised as premature and motivated by an urge to declare the war as over and won. The Statens incapacity to protect returnees and prevent militarisation of social activities has been blamed on its institutional weakness.

In some areas CACs form an integral part of the reconstruction process, including the establishment of civil institutions and democratic processes. Many are elected by their peers and become respected community leaders. They act, in effect, as a much needed rural police, funded by the community and under the authority of the municipal government. By not recognising the law that permits service in the CACs as constituting military service and by forcibly recruiting from their ranks, members of the military have been jeopardising the security of some communities. Organisations of displaced people emerged at the provincial level in 1987 and began working with local NGOs and Mesas from whom they receive advice and minimal funding. In April 1996, the National Coordinating Body for Organisations of Internally Displaced People and Communities in Reconstruction staged the First National Congress of Internally Displaced People, held in Lima. The Congress issued a number of demands upon the government including the introduction of legislation recognising displacement as a social issue; the inclusion in the governmentns assistance programmes of representatives of the organisations of the displaced; and the formulation of policy at the regional level and its coordination at the national level, in collaboration with NGOs and others working with IDPs and returnees.

In recognising the lack of protection available for the displaced population, the national Mesa has put forward a Proposal of Attention and Integral Protection for the rights of the displaced population and laws to protect those unjustly detained or without the correct documentation. It argues that displacement in Peru is a direct consequence of the conflict, a lack of respect for human rights and socioeconomic disparities between different areas and different socioethnic groups. The decisions of IDPs over whether to return to their places of origin or to settle elsewhere should be respected and supported by the government and those organisations helping them.

Seán Loughna is Research Assistant at the RSP. He has written articles on several Latin American countries and is currently undertaking fieldwork in Guatemala.

1. Report of the Representative of the SecretaryGeneral Mr Francis M Deng, submitted pursuant to the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/57; Profiles in Displacement: Peru. 4 January 1996.

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October 1996