Introduction
The operating guidelines behind UNHCR's approach in Bosnia were based on the principles of impartiality, neutrality and humanity, as recently formulated by an inter-agency working group and disseminated by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The guidelines demand that:
the decision to involve military assets be made by the humanitarian organisations;
military assistance be requested only where no civilian alternative exists;
the humanitarian operation retain its civilian nature;
military personnel respect humanitarian principles and codes of conduct;
large-scale involvement of military personnel in direct delivery of assistance be avoided;
the humanitarian operation retain its international character.
In 1992 the state of war in Bosnia and the siege of Sarajevo led UNHCR to request intervention by UN forces, firstly to undertake the Sarajevo airlift and secondly to escort the subsequent humanitarian aid convoys (Security Council Resolutions 770 and 776). The arrival of the peacekeepers, however, was not met by universal enthusiasm among UNHCR and NGO personnel.
Humanitarian agencies feared that the integrity of their principles
and mandate would be compromised in accommodating the military and the
potential use of force which that implied. The military in turn had to
overcome their low regard for those whom they assumed to be
undisciplined, amateur do-gooders and therefore an impediment to the
efficient accomplishment of their tasks. Inevitably, cooperation in
Bosnia developed slowly and reluctantly.
Mandates
Both sides had to learn to respect and make complementary use of one another's mandates and capabilities. This process is easier where there is agreement about the presence and roles of both humanitarian agencies and peacekeepers; from 1992-95, this agreement did not exist in Bosnia. For most of these three years, there was no peace to keep and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), given tasks such as the protection of safe areas, was pushed beyond the bounds of impartiality.
From UNHCR's perspective, two elements of the situation also
introduced elements beyond its original mandate. Firstly, it was
working in an area of conflict. Both the military and the
International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(ICRC) are specifically designed to work in such environments but this
is not part of UNHCR's usual directives. Secondly, the situation in
Bosnia required UNHCR to work where there were no refugees; under an
extension of its mandate, UNHCR was instead working to ensure the
rights and wellbeing of displaced and war-affected people, so that
they would not be forced to leave their own land.
Principles and practice
Humanitarian agencies have to be perceived to be impartial. UNHCR assessed the needs of the people in Bosnia without prejudice and served them all impartially. It was only by achieving this that UNHCR was able to sustain its operations in Bosnia for so long. Carrying out the UNHCR mandate of providing protection and assistance was difficult enough in the context of charges of linkages and unfair distribution but the expectation that UNPROFOR could continue to be neutral and impartial while protecting some areas against others was completely unrealistic. Credit rather than criticism is due to UNPROFOR for having survived for as long, and for having accomplished as much, as it did.
UNPROFOR gradually took responsibility for deciding when aid convoys could move, on which routes and with what type of escort. Finally, by mid 1995, the scale of the security problems facing humanitarian operations led some UNHCR senior staff to ask UNPROFOR to provide armoured trucks driven by uniformed and armed soldiers for the airport-to-Sarajevo run.
Problems arose when UNPROFOR moved from providing UNHCR convoy
escort to advising where and when such escort was needed. The slide
into the logic of war was compounded by a mandate which demanded that
UNPROFOR undertake increasingly militarised action (for which their
forces were unequipped). This called into question the basic
humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality which UNHCR was
attempting to maintain, because of the literal and figurative
association among all UN bodies. By the time UNPROFOR's possible
withdrawal was on the agenda (late 1994, six months into a cessation
of hostilities when convoys were running easily into Federation
territory), UNHCR's 10 field offices were asked how their work would
be affected, should UNPROFOR depart. Prepared to hear that 'we would
be better off without them', UNHCR instead received messages detailing
all the activities in which UNPROFOR was involved, beyond establishing
convoy and personal security, which complemented and enhanced the
humanitarian mission and improved the quality of life for Bosnians.
These were among the confidence-building measures which contributed
substantially to the gradual return to normality, particularly outside
the safe areas, bringing periods of peace which in turn resulted in an
interest in negotiating (until more forceful measures produced even
clearer and quicker results).
Safe areas
In assessing the problems encountered by inter-agency cooperation in
Bosnia, safe areas take precedence. Not only were 'safe areas'
blatantly misnamed, in that there were not enough troops to guard
them, but the definition of their boundaries was completely
inadequate: agencies had no idea where they began and ended. This
caused enormous problems for the military who, when air-strikes were
being contemplated, were forced to ask whether or not such action was
legitimate. The overt message to those who found themselves in such
areas was that they were safe, that they were protected and therefore
not allowed to protect themselves. In practice, they had no resources
to protect themselves, and remained unprotected by the UN. UNHCR found
itself inside the safe area but surrounded by hostile forces and
unable either to protect or adequately assist the population.
Cooperation
Over time, the agencies have developed a set of guidelines designed to facilitate cooperation. These are summarised in UNHCR's 'ten steps to effective coordination':
central coordination
establishment of reasonable expectations
common geographic areas of reconnaissance
establishment of common centres of operation
technically compatible communications
exchange of liaison officers
inter-agency meetings
routine contact between desk officers
civil-military operation cells
joint assessment missions
Most importantly, there must be:
one central office or individual in charge (in Bosnia, until mid 1995, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, complemented by UNHCR, acted as the lead humanitarian agency)
daily meetings of all partners
establishment of civil-military operation cells
exchange of liaison officers
joint determination of roles and responsibilities
UNHCR advocates that both the lead agency and the lead individual be civilian. It became clear that a humanitarian lead agency, in this case UNHCR, has to be the body that invites the military to participate in humanitarian operations. The military themselves cannot decide to intervene and even political actors are inappropriately placed to make such decisions. It also has to be recognised that the military should only be brought in when there is no other option: when no- one else can do the job.
Expectations of the various agencies must be realistic. On occasion, the military cannot perform their assigned roles any better than a civilian organisation and, in such cases, humanitarian agencies have an obligation to cooperate.
It is important not to stereotype either military or humanitarian
staff. Many members of the military community in Bosnia were immensely
enthusiastic about humanitarian work. Likewise, humanitarians can
learn much by taking a positive attitude to military approaches.
Sometimes the requirement for inter-agency cooperation compels a
reassessment of conventional ways of working.
Conclusions
Clearly, those involved in situations of humanitarian emergency can no longer afford to separate work into discrete compartments, where one takes an exclusively humanitarian role, one a purely military function and the other only a political role. There has to be a more coordinated and cooperative approach.
Learning about one another's mandates is vital if there is to be any meaningful cooperation. ICRC, for example, has more rigid principles than UNHCR; each needed to be reminded of the function of the other and to devise ways of making these complementary.
The UN presence, however flawed, preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, Bosnia appears (sadly) to have moved far from the original multi-ethnic democratic ideal for which a savage war has been fought. But had there been no UN, providing even the limited protection and assistance of which it was capable, according to the resolutions and budgets which governed it, Bosnia would have disappeared, carved up between two more powerful and ruthless neighbours.
Where there is peace and the prospect of repatriation and
post-conflict reconstruction, military and humanitarian agencies are
more willing and more able to see how they can work together without
offending their separate identities and competencies. However, where
there is no peace or where a complex emergency exists which requires
intervention by both humanitarian agencies and the military, then the
principles outlined above become more important in influencing the
decisions on when and how the military intervenes, and how far
humanitarian agencies should go in their reliance on the military.
Karen Abu Zayd was UNHCR's Chief of Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
from 1993-95 and is currently the High Commissioner's Chef de
Cabinet.
(This article is a compilation of the notes and transcription of a speech given by Karen AbuZayd at the RSP's Military Conference, November 1995. The notes were based on documents developed from the experience of military/humanitarian cooperation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNHCR's Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations and DHA's Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations.)
April 1997