The question of military involvement in humanitarian operations is
currently generating considerable interest, largely because of the way in
which the military component of UN peacekeeping in Somalia, Rwanda and
Bosnia was obliged to become involved either in direct humanitarian
assistance or in its suppport. Considering, however, that Cambodia was
probably the first instance of the military playing a non-military role in
a UN intervention operation, it is surprising that UNTAC's achievements
have received so little attention. No previous UN military peacekeeping
mission had ever created an official 'Civic Action' role for its staff or
become involved in civilian 'goodwill exercises' in a systematic way. The
Cambodian operation was influential in the general acceptance of the need
for a humanitarian dimension in subsequent UN peacekeeping operations.
Background
The traditional view among humanitarian organisations was that military peacekeepers could not play a non-military role. Equally, many senior military personnel either felt that humanitarian action and military action were mutually exclusive or they doubted the feasibility of the military being able to take on this additional role, given that, at that time, the military still lacked training in peacekeeping skills, let alone in humanitarian work.
From the start, however, the UNTAC Force Commander in Cambodia, Lt General Sanderson, proposed that the military should have a mandated 'civilian side' with a specific budget. UNTAC military contingents would be located in parts of the country where the local population knew little or nothing of the reasons for the UN presence. If the military were to succeed in bringing warring factions together, they would need the support of the local people. (It was for the same reason that, in rural areas under their control, Khmer Rouge cadres carried out simple goodwill activities, especially during the pre-election period.) Furthermore, with the UNTAC military possessing the largest logistical and communications capability of all UN agencies in Cambodia, it was short-sighted not to consider its use for promoting UN image-building. Likewise, it was counter-productive to expect military personnel, especially in remote areas, to ignore - even if only for security reasons - the conditions under which the local people lived.
The UN in New York did not accept these reasons, arguing that civic
actions were not part of the military's task and that, should supportive
local projects prove necessary, they would be the responsibility of
UNTAC's Rehabilitation Component. UNTAC, however, had no separate funds
and all funding requests would have to be approved by UN New York with all
the delays that this would inevitably involve.
Unofficial actions
Although Lt General Sanderson's proposal was rejected, the idea did not disappear. Soon, spasmodic unofficial civic activities were being carried out by various battalions in different parts of the country. An officer was then appointed to oversee the effectiveness of these activities and in March 1993, almost a year after UNTAC's official deployment and only a few months before their departure, a small separate UNTAC Civic Action Cell was eventually established to facilitate a structured approach. All battalion commanders were instructed to set up a medical programme for the people in their catchment area and battalions which included an engineering section were also instructed to investigate how their expertise could benefit the local community.
The fait accompli had been officially recognised. Every sector Commander was required to appoint a staff officer as civic action coordinator and team leaders were advised to adopt a specific local project. Guidelines were drawn up which included the following points:
Projects should benefit and involve the target community at large and be operational before the end of UNTAC's Mission.
Technological input should be appropriate.
NGO involvement should be solicited to ensure continuity and avoid duplication.
UNTAC informed NGOs and other organisations operating in the field
about its policy and capabilities, offering to cooperate in certain
projects and requesting guidance, where necessary, on what was being
done already before initiating separate battalion projects.
Achievements
The achievements of the different battalions varied widely, mainly due to funding availability and different conceptions as to what constituted 'civic' action.
Before UNTAC left, it was clear that there was a striking contrast
in attitude towards UNTAC between the rural and urban communities.
Phnom Penh (home to fewer than 10% of Khmers) benefitted most from
UNTAC's presence, yet the urban Cambodians' perceptions of the UN
operation were invariably negative; those of the rural community, on
the other hand, were overwhelmingly positive. The UNTAC military won
hearts and minds in the provinces but not in Phnom Penh.
1. In the provinces
The Dutch battalion received over US$500,000 from the Dutch Development Plan and were able to take on larger projects such as building or renovating schools and hospitals, drilling wells, digging shallow water reservoirs and establishing a malaria prevention programme. The French contingent was also fortunate; they received considerable support from French NGOs as well as funds for small quick impact projects (QUIPs) from UNICEF and UNHCR. Their projects focused mainly on small-scale structural renovation.
Several battalions such as Indonesia and India, convinced that civic action was an integral part of their military mission, received support in kind from their governments. Their activities ranged from providing medical assistance to renovating pagodas. They also established several QUIPs to refurbish schools and buildings, which were funded by UNICEF and UNHCR.
All other battalions depended largely on their own devices. The Bangladeshis, with their marked empathy for the impoverished Khmers, concentrated on low cost ideas that had worked well in their own country, with an emphasis on basic hygiene and simple farming methods. Their impact on the local community was marked. Shortage of funds did not prevent the Tunisians either from having a substantial impact in their sectors.The Malaysian battalion's activities were on a smaller scale but also effective, especially in the field of medical treatment and assistance.
Apart from donating toys and stationery to an orphanage and schools in Takeo, however, the Japanese engineering battalion accomplished little beyond its original task, although, when the Japanese withdrew in mid September, they handed over equipment and goods worth US$11 million. The Chinese engineering contingent also kept a relatively low profile.
2. Phnom Penh Zone
Apart from the Bulgarian military contingent, whose sexual proclivities and general lack of disciplined effort were notorious, the remaining area of UNTAC military activity was in and around Phnom Penh Zone. Here, the Ghanaian and Indonesian battalions were mainly concerned with the provision of transport to NGOs. This had little effect on urban attitudes which, due to widely reported instances of reckless driving, inconsiderate or offensive behaviour, sexual harrassment and cultural insensitivity, had turned sour after the initial euphoria that greeted the arrival of the first UNTAC military group.
Of greater local impact were the efforts of the German medical team runnning the Field Hospital in Phnom Penh. Despite UN New York policy guidelines which stated that treatment should be confined exclusively to UNTAC personnel, German military doctors and medics insisted on treating any locals who presented themselves. Thanks to the provision of additional medical supplies and funds from the German and Japanese governments, the Field Hospital treated nearly 16,000 Khmer out-patients and 1,381 in-patients up to mid August 1993. It soon became known to Khmers as the 'House of the Helping Gods'.
Overall, largely because of the original UN prohibition, the
combined medical services of the UNTAC military treated only 27% of
all Cambodians seeking medical attention (47,810 throughout the
country). This is a surprisingly low percentage given the chronic
state of the country's public health facilities especially outside the
capital city.
Results
The most important advantages gained by the UNTAC military's civic actions were the enhancement of security within their area (a traditional military preoccupation) and a positive reinforcement, especially in the more remote locations, of the UN's image and reputation for impartiality. Together with the success of the electoral operation, the latter was a much needed counterbalance to the largely unwholesome image of UN troops when in Phnom Penh city. Although the official coordinated civic action programme began only three months before the elections, the total effect, even in cost/benefit terms, was largely positive in the rural heartland.
However, there were ground level problems, ranging from the bureaucratic to the practical. Some NGOs in the field initially did not wish to work with the military. Organisational 'ownership' prerogatives plus coordination difficulties both within the UN system and among NGOs were also a factor, as was the virtual impossibility of obtaining funding from the central Mission budget. Some civic actions were more of the 'hand-out' nature than self-help. Medical projects outstripped the generally poor performance of the engineering contingents. Finally, given the differences in availability of funds, there was also an inevitable disparity in what was achieved between the various military sectors.
On balance, however, the experience showed that any large scale
peacekeeping force, simply through its professional planning capacity
and logistical capability, has advantages that must be used
outside the purely military sphere, if the operation is to be a
success from the viewpoint of the country concerned.
Lessons
To be effective, the military must have a civic mandate and a small budget right from the start, even if certain governments will wish to support the activities of their own troops.
Military staff should be told that civic activities are integral to their mission, not an optional extra.
Liaison with existing relief and developmental organisations in the field is essential to avoid misunderstandings and resentment but also to match their requirements with military capabilities.
While 'hearts and minds' projects have a media value, they should not be seen as mere propaganda exercises to provide favourable country contingent photo-opportunities.
Projects must be quick-acting and reflect the particular expertise that the military has to offer; they should be self-contained and capable of being sustained after the Mission is over.
Where feasible, the soldiers' cultural and religious affinities and their experience of similar levels of country development should be considered when deciding on the placement of UN military units.
Greater attention needs to be paid to the profile of soldiers selected for UN service. With the traditional right to use force proscribed, the military's authority depends on appropriate behaviour in uniform. Rules of behaviour for off-duty soldiers should be clear and strictly enforced. On far too many occasions in Cambodia, the comportment of soldiers in uniform left much to be desired. If this had not been the case, the marked disparity in attitudes towards the military between Khmer urban and rural dwellers might have been less striking.
Finally, the Cambodian experience strongly suggests that a
pre-accepted auxiliary civic role in any forthcoming UN military
operation can also help to win over public opinion in countries where
the involvement of national troops abroad is viewed with disfavour.
Conclusion
Acceptance of these points could add a new perspective to
international peacekeeping and consequently lead to a wider acceptance
by the general public of the mounting cost of such operations. It
might also move those who dogmatically maintain that the goals of the
UN military and humanitarian agencies are fundamentally opposed and
that collaboration should only take place if there is no other option,
to a more pragmatic appreciation that the increasing use of UN armed
forces cannot but influence the international humanitarian relief
system. And that each other's strengths should therefore be harnessed
to mutual advantage. If the military in UN peacekeepng operations need
to be humanitarianised, NGOs could equally well do with a touch of
military professionalism.
April 1997