RPN 23 January-April 1997

6. Beyond humanitarian relief: economic development efforts in northern Iraq by Jeffrey S Pilkington

In 1993-94, Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), the four nation coalition enforcing and monitoring UN Security Council resolutions in northern Iraq, was involved in efforts to decrease Kurdish dependence on aid through attempts to stimulate economic development in the three northern Governorates of Iraq, often referred to as the Kurdish Autonomous Zone. Sharing details of attempts to stimulate economic activity in northern Iraq may present a different perspective of military involvement in humanitarian missions and, while every humanitarian operation is unique, may provide insight into possibilities for decreasing dependence on aid in other humanitarian operations.

Background

Prior to mid 1993, the main focus of Operation Provide Comfort spending in northern Iraq was on reconstructing villages destroyed by the Iraqi military, providing food and fuel for the people of the area and funding NGO efforts in resettling those who fled to the mountains to escape Iraqi reprisals in April of 1991.

This was an area virtually cut off from the rest of the world by UN sanctions on all of Iraq and by a Government of Iraq (GOI) blockade on Kurdish controlled areas. Actions to enhance economic activity required careful consideration of political, legal and moral implications of creating a different 'quality of life' for the people of northern Iraq vis-a -vis the rest of the nation. The options for economic stimulation were limited by the varied agendas of the coalition nations and by their different views on the future of a Kurdish controlled territory, as well as by UN involvement in all issues relating to sanctions. Military involvement in the economy grew out of concern over the continually worsening economic conditions of the region and the coincident increasing dependence of the people of northern Iraq on humanitarian aid. Circumstances arising in 1993 led to opportunities to improve the economy of the region

In August 1993, the GOI cut electrical power to two of the three Kurdish controlled governorates. The loss of electricity affected water supply and sanitation in the urban sections of the area and resulted in a short but severe health crisis from water-borne diseases. This situation led to the lifting of UN sanctions for certain health related items such as emergency generators and generator spare parts (required for electricity in health care facilities). It was also necessary to find trained personnel to operate and maintain the equipment or, as was most often the case, to upgrade skills through special training. Thus jobs in the field of generator maintenance and repair were created for a number of local people. During this time an unexpected US appropriation of some US$23 million offered the possibility for more job creation initiatives. Two and a half years of sanctions and the GOI blockade, combined with the widespread destruction of most means of production and commerce, had left very few opportunities for employment in the area. Working for NGOs or smuggling goods across international borders were among the few alternatives to subsistence agriculture.

The signs of almost total economic stagnation were everywhere. Fields were mostly bare - for lack of fertilizer or insecticide or because there was no market for the wheat grown or no-one who could afford to buy it. Factories which had employed hundreds of workers were now deserted. Withdrawal (without warning) of the twenty dinar banknote from circulation the previous year - wiping out many people's life savings at a single stroke - had financially ruined many former employers. Many villages were populated by only women and children, the majority of men having been detained or killed.

The psychological effect of no employment opportunities prompted most remaining able-bodied men to become Peshmerga (Kurdish militia) which took them away from their families, thereby exacerbating the problem of the dependence of women and children on humanitarian aid.

Beyond relief

The combination of extra funds and the lifting of certain UN sanctions presented a limited but important 'window of opportunity' to stimulate economic activity. While OPC was working with local Kurdish leaders to identify and select sustainable employment options, another interesting thing happened. It became obvious that the World Food Programme (WFP), which was responsible for procurement and storage of wheat and wheat flour as an emergency reserve for the more difficult winter humanitarian relief period, was - due to policy problems - well behind in its efforts to procure and store the necessary quantities of wheat. As OPC guidance from the coalition nations included 'ensuring the people of northern Iraq have enough food for the winter', the coalition military contingent worked with WFP to transfer responsibility for acquiring winter wheat from WFP to OPC, to ensure that the job was completed before the winter snows arrived. This transfer resulted in OPC sending a military contracting officer with significant budgetary authority to all three of the Kurdish controlled governorates of Iraq. Having an officer with spending authority on the ground (as opposed to in Turkey or Baghdad) proved instrumental in helping to stimulate employment opportunities.

The success of efforts to stimulate the economy and create jobs began with a decision to buy wheat from the Kurds, who had land and production means, and then give it back as humanitarian relief to those who required continued assistance. In a world without political constraints this might seem a rather basic concept. It was, in fact, a very controversial idea - but an idea which worked well. Those who owned (or controlled) land jumped at the opportunity to get their land working again. All they needed was a guaranteed buyer, plus some help in terms of seed, insecticide and parts for farming equipment. To provide these, OPC again had to negotiate over sanctions and acquire some special expertise from military and civilian sources. Eventually, the provision of a guaranteed wheat market, with a competitive market price, generated hundreds of jobs which covered the whole spectrum of the grain business from preparing the land for planting, to harvesting, storing, processing, sacking and distribution.

The presence of a contracting officer in the field attracted local entrepreneurs with ideas for employment opportunities, many of which were linked to previous uses of OPC funds. For example, thousands of herd animals had been purchased during the previous years to replace animals killed or stolen either before or after the Gulf War but they had not been vaccinated. An American NGO took on the task; it hired a number of local men and has vaccinated around 500,000 animals each year since mid 1993. The increase in the number of herd animals as a result of the vaccinations is impossible to estimate but is certainly significant; hundreds which had been purchased with OPC money had previously been dying from various seasonal diseases. Just as importantly, many jobs were created. Increased mine clearing and well drilling were among other activities which employed a number of local people and saved lives in the process.

Perhaps as significantly, the extra funds also allowed construction of a road which connected all three Kurdish governorates without crossing Iraqi controlled territory. During the previous winter (1992-93), 19 trucks carrying OPC-funded relief supplies had been blown up by Iraqi guards at GOI checkpoints, despite all truck convoys being escorted by UN guards. Road building required finding equipment, putting it in working order, reconstructing an asphalt plant and implementing major earth moving projects in some very mountainous areas. The new road was completed in December 1993 (built by Kurdish workmen under the supervision of a British NGO engineer). Since then, not one truck has been blown up in the area, saving millions of dollars worth of relief supplies, especially medicine, in addition to providing jobs for over a hundred men who have continued to do road repair and maintenance in the area. Following the health crisis due to water-borne diseases, a number of open ditches and exposed sewer lines were enclosed or covered. These operations employed a number of both skilled and unskilled workers and have saved lives which would have been lost to such diseases as dysentery and cholera.

When some NGOs were fired upon by unknown assailants in remote areas of northern Iraq, OPC hired Peshmerga soldiers to man observation posts on high terrain to discourage snipers. This was a useful way to pay men who had been doing the same job along Kurdish-Iraqi lines for years without pay while at the same time improving security for NGOs working in rural areas.

It is important to mention that every paid job generated more jobs and exponentially added to the economy of the region. When people can afford to buy things, other people begin to grow and make things to sell. Of course, because of sanctions and the blockade, this was a 'closed economy' and an industrial infrastructure could not develop. Nevertheless, by early 1994, vegetable markets were thriving, fields were under cultivation and construction was in evidence throughout the area.

Lessons indicated
Many relief workers in Iraq during the 1993-94 period will be familiar with these activities without knowing how they occurred. The lessons learned by those involved may be familiar but are worth repeating:
1. Seeking the advice of local leaders in determining the feasibility and sustainability of economic options is essential to success. Doing otherwise will, at the very least, waste time and money.
2. Thinking in the long term and thinking how projects will survive after aid funding expires are essential for sustainable development. OPC mainly supported projects which only needed 'seed' funding, with the possibility of becoming self sustaining.
3. Knowing how to work within the UN bureaucracy is essential if implementation of initiatives is dependent upon UN approval or support. OPC required help in this area from various ministries within the coalition governments.
4. Preparing the local people or NGOs, preferably indigenous NGOs, to take over functionswhen the military forces depart is essential for sustainng projects. OPC worked hard to train local people and include them in decision making so they would have a 'corporate memory' of the development process.
5. Monitoring the progress of economic enterprises to anticipate problems means that a robust and reliable system of data collection is essential.
6. Flexibility is required to avoid wasting time and money. Projects which do not work must be adjusted or discarded.
7. Ensuring that salaries paid to local employees are comparable to those in the local employment market is extremely important. Salary margins should be scrupulously maintained. This requires attention to detail when operating in an area such as Iraq, for example, where teachers were paid the equivalent of US$5 per month and doctors US$7 per month.
8. 'Windows of opportunity' close as fast and unexpectedly as they open. Those in leadership positions must plan for contingencies and be ready to act boldly when opportunities appear.



Interventions which will develop an area can generate conflicting political interests. This was certainly true in northern Iraq where any action construed as 'nation building' raised fears of the possible recognition of an independent 'Kurdistan'. Continuation of OPC was contingent on a six month approval process by the Turkish Parliament; factions within Turkey argued that OPC had already lasted too long and was interfering with their anti-PKK operations in eastern Turkey and Iraq. Actions taken had to be explained in advance to Turkish counterparts. Keeping them well informed and involved in decision making was essential to maintaining harmony within the coalition.

Conclusion

Years of UN sanctions and the Iraqi economic blockade had systematically deprived the Kurds not only of jobs but of hope for a better future for themselves and their children. Our objective was to use aid funding to stimulate economic opportunities and thereby to offer hope and restore human dignity.

Additional funding and the lifting of certain sanctions allowed Operation Provide Comfort to take actions which decreased the region's dependence on humanitarian aid. Given the opportunity (ie political approval), military forces can do more than disaster relief and peacekeeping. Numerous political leaders from the four coalition nations who visited northern Iraq during 1993-94 were unanimous in their approval of OPC's achievements. Recent events in northern Iraq may have reversed many advances made towards independence from the relief system but conditions for many in the region were improved for almost three years.

Brigadier General Jeffrey S Pilkington (United States Air Force, Retired) was Commanding General of Operation Provide Comfort in 1993-94. He is currently a Visiting Study Fellow at the RSP.

Notes

1. Four nation coalition: France, Turkey, UK and US.

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April 1997