My observations suggest that two major causes of misunderstanding between humanitarian relief organisations and military forces are a lack of trust and a lack of communication at the proper levels between organisations.
One obvious cause of mistrust is the fact that military forces usually arrive too late in a crisis and leave too early. Having managed without military help when it was most needed, the relief organisations are just getting used to military involvement in a humanitarian operation when the military forces depart, taking with them their logistics and security capacity. The failure to communicate is usually the result of leaders being too busy during the crisis to take time to get to know each other, to understand each other's problems and to establish trust and mutual respect.
The following are some suggestions to help relief organisations
make the most of the presence of military forces:
1. Do not assume that military personnel have either training or experience in humanitarian relief operations. While the senior officers in charge of military forces will normally have considerable leadership abilities and technical skills, they are unlikely to have any experience of humanitarian emergencies. Senior military officers move frequently from posting to posting and it would be unusual for a senior officer to be directly involved in more than one humanitarian operation. Therefore, experienced relief workers should assume that they have knowledge which can be of great value to the military and should seek opportunities to share it.
2. Seek opportunities to inform the military of your organisation's capabilities. Tell military leaders about your organisational strengths. If you have a core of expertise which could be expanded with help from the military, do not miss an opportunity to seek that help.
3. Send the right person to meetings with military representatives. Send someone who can speak with authority for your organisation and contribute to the decision making process; you never know what decisions may be made at seemingly unimportant meetings. It will also prove extremely valuable, when possible, to send the same person - a 'military liaison' officer - to all meetings. Knowing what decisions have been made or issues discussed previously will be a definite advantage.
4. Do not be afraid to ask the military leadership for help or favours. For example, aircraft or trucks can often carry one more person or crate. The bureaucracy will probably tell you 'no' but if you get an opportunity to ask the commander or a senior officer, they may well say 'yes', or at least try to help. It never hurts to ask but it is important to ask the right person in the hierarchy.
5. Do not be concerned about the military taking credit for your organisation's accomplishments. This is often a concern among certain relief organisations, especially those which depend upon publicity for continued funding. A military public affairs officer taking pictures and collecting facts about your organisation's accomplishments does not indicate that the military will attempt to take credit for your work. Senior officers are trained to give credit and take blame and you should therefore expect military leaders to highlight the role of civilian organisations in successful humanitarian interventions and downplay the role of the military. Military commanders usually operate under strict orders to stay out of the spotlight - the media. In the unlikely event that your aid organisation experiences problems with military public affairs representatives, raise the issue with the commander at the first opportunity; it is likely that the problem will be solved satisfactorily.
6. Invite the military leadership to visit your organisation and learn about its activities. When such visits take place, make sure the best person is on hand to convey confidence and competence. Show the good and the bad, give facts and figures and, as previously stressed, do not assume that the visitor has a great deal of knowledge of your area of expertise. Try to make the military as knowledgeable as possible about your organisation. You may make a friend in the process.
7. Keep in mind what the military does best. They bring logistical strength: the ability to move large quantities rapidly over long distances. They can rapidly gather enough manpower to do large jobs and, if politics permit, they can provide security at the local level so that humanitarian operations can be conducted in an atmosphere of safety.
8. Position your organisation to take over their functions when military forces depart. Relief organisations will always know better than the military which civilian groups can best take over certain functions when the military departs. Representatives from those organisations must get involved in military operations as soon as possible so that the military will not make decisions which will later complicate transition of functions from military to civilian control. If the military fails to invite this type of participation, relief organisations must find ways to be involved. Leadership from several organisations may have to join forces to encourage the military's interest in long term planning.
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The military may continue to arrive late and depart early but in neither case by choice. When they do arrive, aid agencies must expect that the military will tend to 'take charge'. Military commanders are usually working under either very tight or uncertain time constraints. The timetables which drive the nature of military interventions are consistently based upon political factors, such as timing of elections, the occurrence of another more visible crisis or the attention span of CNN or the BBC. Senior commanders know that they may only have a short time to accomplish their mission and uncertain timetables favour decisive 'take charge' action. But the military cannot take over all aspects of an operation and it may well be the best course of action for aid workers to accept this and do all they can to help the military leaders gain the maximum knowledge in the minimum time. Cooperation is the best way to serve those in need of aid.
April 1997