People from the Middle East attempting to reach the US navigate varied terrains as well as bureaucracy, corruption and changing visa regimes. Migration brokers develop dynamic networks, both regular and irregular, to help people move.

The following words, from a migration broker in Istanbul, illustrate an emerging trend of long-distance journeys from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey into the Americas:

It costs around $17,000. We get them visas for Brazil and Nicaragua. They travel to Brazil, then fly on to Nicaragua. From there, they pass through Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico to the US border, about a month’s journey. It’s safer; they don’t have to go through Colombia or Panama. We can also help with asylum paperwork, but that costs more. We have plans for everything.

While forced migration from the Middle East to Europe has long attracted policy attention, tighter European borders and cutbacks in formal resettlement have prompted many to head towards North America. As a result, arrivals from the Middle East at the US–Mexico border have surged in recent years.

This article argues that migration routes should be understood not as fixed geographical paths but as dynamic networks of legal–geographical possibilities.[1] ‘Legal’ and ‘illegal’ statuses emerge in a shifting continuum shaped by laws, policies and social contexts, rather than existing as fixed opposites. What migrants and facilitators call the ‘game’ – rather than ‘smuggling’ – embodies this fluidity. It represents an interplay of legal statuses, visa requirements, and strategic decision-making across multiple jurisdictions.

Each type of movement has its classification in this system, from ‘khodandaz’ (‘self-directed game’ in Farsi) involving walking through forests and mountains to ‘taxi game’ using vehicles to cross borders, ‘ship game’ utilising boats, ‘police game’ involving coordinated actions with border officials, and ‘ticket game’ using trains or buses. Some attempt the ‘air game’, using borrowed or forged documents to fly directly to their destination. Information shared on social media, such as which embassy is most lenient or which checkpoints demand only minimal bribes, allows migrants to piece together a route that is never completely regular yet not entirely clandestine.

At each stage – acquiring a visa, crossing a border or seeking a permit – people toggle between recognised and unrecognised forms of movement, in ways seldom captured by binaries such as regular versus irregular or migrant versus refugee. Instead, each transition relies on the reading of local law enforcement practices, diplomatic entanglements and unexpected policy changes. Even legally obtained documents can become meaningless if a checkpoint’s rules abruptly shift, or if an officer interprets paperwork as invalid.

Brokers thus function as navigators of legal–geographical possibilities, continually orchestrating ways to keep their clients in, or close to, nominal legality. Their expertise lies less in maintaining static corridors than in reading and re-reading shifting legal frameworks and anticipating changes in visa policies, enforcement patterns and diplomatic relations that might open or close particular pathways. In this sense, the ‘game’ is a strategic system: individuals must learn its rules, improvise when constraints tighten, and pivot when new openings arise.

Migration from the Middle East to the US–Mexico border traverses a legal landscape that is as complex as it is unpredictable. Rather than following a linear, pre-determined route, migrants move through multiple layers of bureaucracy, corruption and continually changing visa regimes. Although no blueprint captures the multitude of possible itineraries, several corridors have emerged as typical examples of how Middle Eastern migrants reach the US–Mexico border by transiting through Latin America.

Brazil as a main entry point

For many Iranians, Brazil is the first legal entry point into Latin America. Although obtaining a Brazilian tourist visa is not guaranteed, many prospective travellers in Tehran or Istanbul turn to migration brokers for assistance. These brokers help applicants in collecting financial statements and other documents, and at times provide false itineraries to enable them to meet visa requirements. Even with such preparation, refusals can happen if consular officers perceive a high risk of onward travel to the US or Canada. When visas are granted, migrants land in São Paulo with legal tourist status for a limited period. Almost immediately, they begin seeking ways to move north. Brokers connect them with local facilitators who arrange overland travel, typically by bus, through the continent. A common path goes from São Paulo into Peru; there, short transit permits for roughly 5–10 days can be secured at some border checkpoints, although the ease of obtaining these permits varies. Migrants describe frequent extortion at Peruvian police checkpoints, where bribes are often demanded to continue onwards. This ‘police game’ can involve facilitators providing specific instructions and sometimes symbolic items; in one account, an interviewee noted that a facilitator provided him with a King of Spades card, a signal meant to ease interactions during document checks. After Peru, most travellers head towards Colombia. Many then converge in Necoclí on Colombia’s northern coast, a launch point for crossing the Gulf of Urabá and approaching the Darién Gap.

The Venezuela route

Although Brazil remains the main entrance gate, Venezuela might also be used as a transit route for Middle Eastern nationals, especially for those coming from Iran, as political partnership has encouraged the government of Venezuela to adopt relatively benign visa procedures for Iranians. From Caracas, some go west to Maracaibo to begin the overland journey north. Crossing Venezuela by this route entails passage through eight to nine security checkpoints, which facilitators will guide migrants across. Once the migrants reach the border of Colombia, they cross the border on foot for around 500 metres, as they cannot take taxis or buses. Then migrants must proceed to a bus terminal where an upfront payment to drivers effectively buys their passage. They must stay on the bus all the way through various checkpoints, as they cannot get off due to their lack of documents. Once across, migrants often join those coming from Brazil, and all of them prepare for the Darién Gap.

Afghanistan to Brazil on humanitarian visas

Afghan migrants follow a distinct pathway that begins with Brazil’s humanitarian visa initiative, a programme introduced after the Taliban regained power in August 2021. Most Afghans residing in Iran or Turkey have either pending refugee applications or refugee status, which allows them to remain in those countries and apply for the programme via the Brazilian embassies there. These visas offer a legal entry point, usually into São Paulo. Many of those who arrive view Brazil as a transit point rather than a destination, however, and will aim to move northwards. The northbound journey starts in Rio Branco, a city near the Peruvian border. They bus through Peru, with many stopping in Cusco, before flying from Lima to Tumbes, a city near Ecuador’s border. The journey continues inland through Ecuador, which can be crossed in one or two days, into Colombia. In Colombia, the trip involves a bus ride to Cali, lasting approximately 24 hours, then on to Necoclí. There, Afghan migrants join others in attempting the crossing of the Darién Gap.

Navigating the Darién Gap: three options

The Darién Gap is a dense, roadless swathe of jungle that connects Colombia and Panama and is the only land bridge between North and South America. Migrants generally have three main options for traversing it. The first involves bypassing the jungle entirely by flying from Brazil to Nicaragua, if they hold valid visas for both countries. In practice, Nicaraguan authorities rarely issue visas to nationals from certain Middle Eastern countries. Consequently, this option is only available to those who can get the services of well-connected brokers who expedite approvals; even then, the high cost of air travel is a formidable barrier.

A second option – the cheapest but most physically and emotionally difficult option – is to cross the Gap on foot. In what facilitators call ‘self-directed games’, migrants are supplied with the equipment they need to navigate thick vegetation, cross dangerous rivers and flee from organised criminal groups.

A third option involves the ‘controlled flow’ policy set up by Panama to manage migrants travelling northwards from South America. This programme requires migrants to register with the Panamanian authorities and provide biometric data after they have crossed the Darién Gap on foot. They are then housed temporarily in a Migrant Reception Station (Estación Temporal de Recepción Migratoria). At the centre of the programme is a structured bus transportation system to Costa Rica, operating via private companies in cooperation with the Panamanian authorities. Although designed to be a safer alternative to irregular routes, the programme does face several important limits. At peak levels, 40-60 buses depart daily, each carrying about 50 migrants. However, this capacity of roughly 2,000-3,000 people per day is still inadequate given the surge in crossings, which reached over 81,000 people in August 2023 alone.[2]

Mexico: the final leg

Once in Mexico, migrants face the last segment of their journey. Two main pathways emerge here. The first is the semi-legal route, which involves obtaining an FMM (Forma Migratoria Múltiple) humanitarian permit. Migrants typically apply for these permits at the Tapachula immigration office near the Guatemala border. The process involves official fees of $150 to $200 and may take days or weeks to complete due to high demand. With an FMM, migrants can travel within the country by bus or air to reach northern border cities. The second pathway involves entirely irregular movement facilitated by smugglers. This option is more expensive, costing $800 to $1,000 or more. Migrants opting for this route often travel in private vehicles at night along remote roads to avoid detection. Regardless of the path chosen, all migrants face numerous police and immigration checkpoints. Even those with official permits frequently face extortion for bribes, typically $10 to $50 per checkpoint.

The need for more nuanced responses

At the time interviews were conducted with the Istanbul-based broker in mid-2024, the cost of travelling from Iran to the US–Mexico border was about $17,000, yet by early 2025 it had increased to $22,000. Such rising costs, tied to sharper border crackdowns and political rhetoric around hardline enforcement, echo a recurring pattern: tougher measures do not halt migration but they do boost prices, intensify threats and entrench deeper reliance on clandestine operations. These shifts in cost structure reflect how facilitators must constantly recalibrate their orchestration of legal–geographical possibilities. As certain pathways close, such as the tightening of Brazilian visa requirements or increased enforcement in the Darién Gap, facilitators forge new combinations of legal documentation and clandestine movement. The ‘game’ thus emerges not just as a set of tactics but as a systemic response to the changing architecture of border control, where each new restriction requires fresh configurations of visas, permits and informal crossings.

In this light, rather than being a simple line drawn on a map, a migration ‘route’ can fragment into multiple transitions. Individuals may begin with valid documents in one country only to lose that status upon crossing an unregulated border or secure short-lived permits that dissolve when a policy changes. Such conditions result in journeys where life and death hinge on navigating physical terrain and rapidly shifting legal frameworks. Accepting that the ‘game’ is built on toggling forms of legality highlights the need to reconceptualise migration governance. While current policy approaches, as seen in both the Americas and Europe, focus on strengthening enforcement along predetermined routes, this research indicates the need for more dynamic and coordinated responses.[3] These could include creating a network of small-scale, mobile processing units in key transit points that could issue short-term humanitarian transit documents without requiring fixed addresses or financial guarantees. These units could employ staff familiar with the languages and circumstances of Middle Eastern migrants and have the flexibility to relocate as migration patterns shift. Implementing a graduated system of regional transit permits would acknowledge the reality of onward movement while providing temporary status. The Panamanian ‘controlled flow’ model could also be expanded to other critical points in the journeys, with dedicated humanitarian corridors that provide safe passage, basic services and temporary documentation. Finally, cross-regional funding mechanisms could distribute financial resources based on actual migration volume rather than geographic location, preventing undue burden on transit countries like Panama or Mexico. These mechanisms could be structured as flexible cooperation agreements that do not require comprehensive multilateral treaties, allowing for quicker implementation and adaptation. Such measures would acknowledge that migration occurs through networks of possibility rather than fixed corridors. The reelection of Donald Trump in 2024 has introduced new uncertainties into US migration policies, yet migration brokers remain active, adapting their strategies to the evolving context. As indicated by their ongoing social media presence offering routes to the US–Mexico border, albeit at higher costs, these networks demonstrate a persistent ability to navigate changing possibilities.

 

Houman Oliaei
Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Babson College, Wellesley
holiaei@babson.edu

 

[1] This article builds on interviews with migrants and facilitators and on secondary policy data.

[2] Yates, Caitlyn, and Pappier, Juan (2023) ‘How the Treacherous Darien Gap Became a Migration Crossroads of the Americas’, Migration Information Source, 20th September 2023

[3] Cortinovis, R (2024) ‘Unpacking the EU “Route-based Approach” to Migration: The Role of Safe Pathways’, PACES Project Policy Brief No 1., Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe

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