- May 2024
Cash-based interventions may have the potential to foster empowerment, autonomy and self-reliance, but unequal implementation and politics surrounding biometric-enabled cash assistance threaten the chances of achieving these aims.
While biometric identification systems and cash-based interventions are not new and have long histories in the humanitarian aid sector, the binding of biometric verification to cash and voucher assistance (CVA) is a relatively new phenomenon. Beginning in 2013, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) introduced biometric verification technology in Kenya to ensure efficiency and accountability in how aid is distributed. Refugees are biometrically enrolled into the UNHCR registration system known as PRIMES using the Biometric Identity Management System.
Biometric technology captures the physiological characteristics used to uniquely identify an individual, including fingerprints, iris scans and facial recognition. In the case of CVAs, biometric technology is used in conjunction with other technologies that deliver cash assistance, including mobile technologies and distributed ledger technologies (i.e. blockchain technology). Over the past two decades, biometric technology has become an integral part of UNHCR operations and is on the rise because of its purported accountability and assurance to donors, as well as regulatory requirements from service providers. In Kenya, due to national legislation, cash programmes must adhere to the Know Your Customer (KYC) and other government requirements for obtaining SIM cards and bank accounts.
The CALP Network recently released The State of the World’s Cash Report 2023, which shows that CVAs now account for 21% of all humanitarian assistance. Cash-based intervention as a modality for delivering assistance offers many promises. First, it promises a rapid, efficient and cost-effective way for humanitarian actors to ensure that aid reaches areas affected by conflict and disasters. Secondly, it promises empowerment, autonomy and dignity of choice for affected peoples, including refugees, as well as stimulating the local economy. By tying biometrics to cash, humanitarian actors claim it will help with accountability, prevent duplication and fraud, and ensure that aid gets to the right individuals. However, biometric-enabled cash assistance can also be political.
This article offers insights into how (and why) cash distribution is approached and experienced differently in and within individual countries, in emergency and protracted crises. I argue that unequal approaches to cash delivery using biometrics could hinder any efforts to promote independence and dignity of choice and can intensify exclusion.
Variations in cash programming
The CVA ecosystem is complex and involves collaboration between a host of actors including UN agencies, donors, host governments, NGOs, tech companies and financial service providers (FSPs), each with their own requirements which have implications on the design of the intervention.
Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps and the Kalobeyi settlement offer good case studies for how cash transfer programmes can vary. Bamba Chakula (Swahili for “get your food”) is the WFP’s cash transfer programme and is delivered using a digital wallet and mobile phone. Through a partnership with Safaricom, WFP assumes guardianship for the SIMS it provides refugee beneficiaries. Money is transferred to the digital wallets of beneficiaries, who then redeem it with designated traders contracted by the agency. Refugees in the Dadaab camp are restricted to receiving this money in the form of digital vouchers meant for designated food vendors for fear that funds could be used for terrorism or other money laundering activities, while refugees in the Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement receive unrestricted cash.
Dadaab, which is made up predominantly of refugees from Somalia, has long been a point of contention, with the Kenyan government threatening to shut down the camp numerous times over the years citing security concerns. Kalobeyei, along with the Kakuma camp, are home to mainly South Sudanese refugees. As one WFP worker in Dadaab explained to me, a programme can present differently in each location because agencies must adhere to the requirements set by the host government.
Problems with restricted cash transfer and biometrics not being recognised
“In Dadaab, I think the government is a bit hesitant to move to unrestricted cash for various reasons, one being insecurity because once you put a lump of money there, you never know what is happening with the money. Maybe it’s sponsoring some of these activities the government doesn’t support, like what is happening with Al-Shabaab.” – WFP Supply Chain Officer
I spoke with refugees in Dadaab about their experiences with biometrics and cash transfer. Their perspectives challenge the narrative that freedom and dignity of choice automatically come with CVA.
In Dadaab, Kakuma and Kalobeyei, refugees go through biometric verification each month to receive assistance. If they fail to appear for food distribution for three months, the card is deactivated. While biometrics are often presented as a reliable means to identify and verify beneficiaries, I spoke with some refugees who told me that their biometric data are not always recognised. I interviewed Haroun, a mechanic, who explained that sometimes his biometric data are not recognised, causing delays in accessing the cash: “I missed Bamba Chakula last month because they said my fingerprints had not been detected. When my fingerprints are not found, my wife comes and scans her finger.”
Another camp resident, Zahra[1], explained her frustation at not being able to purchase the food items she needed: “Only some shops can accept, and they force us to take food items from their shops. If I ask for the 1000 shillings to buy other food, he says no. You can only take what is here. What I need, he doesn’t have. So, if you’re not free to get what you want, then what’s it good for?”
Although the cash transfer is intended for food, it is common for refugees to use it to purchase other necessities, such as medication, or pay for services, including school fees. I learned from one of my focus groups with refugees living in Ifo that it is common to ask vendors to exchange their vouchers for cash at a cost to buy medication – a cost that decreases the value of the voucher.
“You have to buy medicine if you have somebody sick at home… so you negotiate with that person [the vendor]. If you say it’s for medicine, he will give it to you. As soon as he hears somebody is sick and you don’t have money, he will pull the money and give you.” George
The use of biometrics as a condition for cash assistance eligibility also helps to maintain a system where refugees feel trapped in the camp. Fingerprint verification is needed monthly to keep their cards active. The money cannot be accessed outside of the camp, in Nairobi for example. Some young people explained to me that the fear of losing Bamba Chakula is one of the factors keeping them there, even though there are limited work opportunities in the camp. If they were to leave, there would be no guarantee of finding work, which could make them more vulnerable.
Data protection risks
There are serious potential risks associated with collecting and storing biometric data. Since private and public actors may be involved, humanitarian agencies have little control over how data could be used once they are shared. Depending on how and where the data are stored, there may also be risks of hacking and data breaches.
The incorporation of biometrics and other technologies into CVA poses risks around consent, privacy, data protection and responsibility. There have already been public examples of what happens when sensitive and immutable data are not protected. In 2021, the government of Bangladesh shared the biometric data (collected by UNHCR) of 830,000 Rohingya refugees with the government of Myanmar for repatriation assessment. That same year, biometric devices belonging to the US military were seized by the Taliban during its takeover. This led to concerns from civil society groups that humanitarian data (including biometrics) collected in Afghanistan would also be compromised.
The use of biometrics varies across operations. We can see this in how UNHCR and its partners have responded to global emergencies. In recent emergency operations in Afghanistan, Yemen and Sudan, biometrics were a requirement to access cash assistance. UN agencies have attempted to implement various accountability measures, including biometrics and GPS tracking, in response to allegations of fraud and aid diversion, some of which resulted in disputes with local governments and the suspension of aid.
Ukraine: a shift away from biometrics or an exception?
A different approach was taken in the response to the Ukraine crisis. Agencies opted to forgo the biometric identification requirement and use other means to provide unrestricted, multipurpose cash assistance in one of the largest emergency responses, with projections of more than one billion disbursed since November 2022. A commentary from Human Rights Watch described the Ukrainian response as a shift and a “significant step in the direction of protecting the rights of people who use aid.”[2]
A closer look, however, reveals that it may not be a shift but rather an exception. This was in part due to the unique context of the Ukraine crisis, where refugees and IDPs had pre-existing identification documents. The high literacy rate among Ukrainians may have helped them feel empowered to refuse the sharing of their personal data. There was also strong advocacy from the Ukrainian state, a coalition of NGOs and other civil society actors that pushed back against the use of biometrics. Many NGOs on the ground refused to collect biometric data and used other means of identification, including tax identity numbers, driver’s licences and passports. The Ukraine Red Cross Society worked closely with the International Federation for the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), FSPs and government departments, including the Ministry of Social Policy, to monitor all aspects of the CVA. Ukraine also has clearly laid out national data protection laws and is governed by the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
In December 2022, UNHCR deployed a blockchain-based payment solution using the Stellar Network for cash distribution to affected people in Ukraine. Blockchain, a decentralised and distributed ledger that stores data permanently, was used in conjunction with mobile phones to give each person a digital wallet. Aid is distributed via a digital wallet using USDC, a stablecoin pegged to the value of the US dollar. Recipients download an app, and a code is sent to their phone to verify that they are in possession of that phone. They confirm a unique piece of information about themselves, such as date of birth. Recipients can then use their driver’s license to withdraw funds at a MoneyGram location. Similar to other cash assistance programmes such as AccessRC which was developed by the IFRC, this is an opt-in programme which allows displaced Ukrainians to decide from one of three methods to receive assistance.
The risks of using biometric verification in the Global South
The use of biometric technology in humanitarian operations, and specifically in cash-based interventions, will likely not decrease but only continue to grow. As the use increases, so does the amount of personal data that is being collected, stored and shared. Such information may be accessed by the different public and private actors involved, including tech companies and FSPs.
Understanding the data security risks around cash programmes that require biometrics is key. Eighty-five per cent of displaced people are hosted in the Global South, where, unlike in Ukraine, data protection policies are often absent, underdeveloped or not enforced. Moreover, these laws rarely bring refugees and other displaced individuals into the folds of any protective frameworks.
Reflections on the broader implications
This article has shown how biometric-enabled cash assistance is administered and experienced differently across humanitarian operations. Host governments can influence how cash transfer programmes are designed and implemented (including refusing them entirely). As we have seen from Dadaab, biometrically enabled cash transfer programmes present several challenges for displaced people such as exclusion because their biometric data may not be recognised and limits on freedom and dignity of choice due to nationality and identity politics.
The distribution of cash through blockchain in the Ukraine response without biometric registration is an interesting development. However, it may not so much represent a shift in industry attitudes but rather an exception because of the strong advocacy from international and Ukrainian civil society. This demands the question: Who is going to advocate for the millions of refugees and displaced peoples in the Global South to ensure that they can benefit from cash assistance without compromising their privacy and freedom of choice?
Roda Siad
PhD Candidate, Communication Studies, McGill University
roda.siad@mail.mcgill.ca