- May 2024
Humanitarian organisations are increasingly calling for the decolonisation of the sector, but this often overlooks colonialities reproduced by technology. By scrutinising the deployment and ubiquity of biometric technologies in the sector, this article seeks to reinvigorate sincere efforts towards decolonisation.
The legacy of colonialism runs deep in the humanitarian sector. Indeed, the uneven power relations and dynamics of the colonial era are on stark display in a sector where minority world organisations continue to assert their priorities above majority world communities. In recent years, humanitarian organisations have increasingly called for decolonisation, but these discussions are still nascent, and the shapeshifting nature of coloniality makes it an immense task. While these conversations and efforts rightly scrutinise power structures within humanitarian operations, for example in programming and fundraising, coloniality in technology is frequently overlooked. The lifecycle of humanitarian technology – how it is developed and deployed – and how subsequent data is collected and processed warrants scrutiny.
This article discusses the interplay between colonial and capitalist tendencies and humanitarian work. By querying the paternalistic idea that identification should be a prerequisite for service delivery for instance, we can start to unpick the colonial assumptions of integrity that are entangled with biometric technologies. Ultimately, in scrutinising the deployment and ubiquity of biometric technologies in the humanitarian sector, this article seeks to reinvigorate sincere efforts towards decolonisation.
Colonialism, coloniality, decolonisation and decolonial futures
Decolonising humanitarianism is a process that requires a simultaneous awareness and analysis of the past, present and future. Though colonialism itself refers to events in the past, of the subjugation and resource extraction of non-western territories and peoples, coloniality demonstrates the continued cultural, political and economic inheritance of colonial systems in the present day.
The humanitarian sector bears the mark of both colonialism and coloniality. Humanitarian colonialism for instance points to the complex relationship between humanitarian ideals and colonial narratives about the neediness of colonised groups. While this does not mean humanitarian work is undertaken with colonising intentions, it does mean that humanitarian work is shaped both implicitly and explicitly by coloniality.
Experiences with biometrics in the humanitarian sector demonstrate how technology can mimic, reintroduce and further entangle colonialist processes and power dynamics. This nexus of technology and coloniality is best described as technocolonialism, a term coined by Dr Mirca Madianou in 2019. Two key elements discussed of technocolonialism apply to the use of biometrics: the reproduction of colonialities of power and the extraction of market value from humanitarian contexts.
Biometric technologies and humanitarian operations
The uptake of biometric data collection in registration and service delivery means the technology has become embedded in humanitarian operations. Following repeated recent examples where biometric data was improperly collected, shared or accessed, and where biometric technology failed or was misused, humanitarian organisations are questioning the role biometrics now play in the sector. But criticism of biometric systems has faltered despite new harms arising from the use of such systems including UNHCR sharing the biometric data of Rohingya refugees with the Bangladesh government, which then shared it with Myanmar; the Taliban gaining access to sensitive biometric data left by minority world donors; and displaced people being excluded from services because of their registration on biometric databases in both Kenya and India.
Those who defend the use of biometrics argue that they help to reduce fraud, make aid programmes more efficient, and benefit programme participants by providing a unique method of identification (e.g. their fingerprint or iris scan). However, research into this issue has repeatedly revealed a lack of evidence to back up these claims. Moreover, increased focus on data protection and the data rights of individuals affected by humanitarian responses has led to questions about whether the risk of using biometrics is worth the potential benefit. Organisations have responded differently to these reflections resulting in the absence of a coherent sectoral approach to biometrics. Without clear norms and practices individuals harmed by biometric systems have been unsuccessful in their search for accountability.
Biometric narratives reproduce colonialities of power
A key aspect of colonialism is its insidiousness – the manner in which coloniality seeps into everyday actions and causes harm. In the case of biometrics it is important to scrutinise both the technology and the conversation around it: what claims are made about biometrics? The humanitarian purposes attributed to biometric use are built upon a set of assumptions around how humanitarian organisations should relate to impacted communities. Digging deeper into the foundational questions about why identification and verification with this particular technology are necessary uncovers how these assumptions are rooted in and reproduce coloniality.
For instance, narratives around the need for biometrics to address fraud assume not only that the person in need of aid may commit fraud in order to receive or access more aid, but also that the problem of fraud at beneficiary level is significant enough to warrant the mass collection of sensitive biometric data of all beneficiaries. Even when evidence shows that fraud at the beneficiary level is minimal and that it is more of an issue in the supply chain, the narrative of the fraudulent beneficiary persists, reinforcing the criminalisation of already vulnerable people.
Narratives of fraud centre a power dynamic wherein recipients are positioned as untrustworthy actors within the resource-constrained environments of the humanitarian sector. Against this backdrop, the use of biometric technologies helps to reassert the primacy of humanitarian organisations as the arbiters of how limited resources should be fairly divided.
By positioning humanitarian organisations as the arbiters of access and recipients as untrustworthy actors who must prove themselves truthful and deserving, biometrics facilitate the continued categorisation of individuals according to minority world definitions of personhood. In this understanding biometric technologies are used to place the loci of control firmly within the grasp of humanitarian organisations. Impacted communities have limited ability to challenge or question the system, and crucially have few pathways to redress when systems go awry.
Funding streams driving mass biometric collection
The dominance of key decision makers in funding streams has cemented the influence and preferences of powerful Global North nation states and international organisations. Much of the sector’s use of biometrics stems from UN agencies who have included the collection of biometric data within their long-term strategies. For example, through The Grand Bargain in 2016, UNHCR committed to expand the use of biometrics for refugee registration to 75 operations globally by 2020. As of 2023, this has expanded to 90 operations. Importantly, commitments by WFP and UNHCR to The Grand Bargain for increasing the use of biometrics in operations are related to the ‘reduce management costs’ workstream.
Notably, the organisations collecting biometrics are funded primarily by Global North governments, many of whom have an interest in the collection and use of biometric data. Though there are some public agreements between UN agencies and governments, often there is a lack of transparency around how biometric data will be used and by whom. The US government, for example, is both a funder of UNHCR and requires UNHCR to share biometric data for every refugee referred for resettlement in the US. This data is permanently stored in a linked web of US government databases, even though less than a quarter of those referred are ultimately accepted for resettlement.
Inability to access data sharing agreements limits the ability of impacted individuals and civil society to gain insights into how data is governed. Where there is a lack of transparency, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is a connection between surveillance efforts, including counterterrorism and military purposes, and biometric collection.
Currently, the narrative of efficiency and fraud control has prevailed over discussions of harm; this includes the research noted above demonstrating the entanglement of biometric technologies in other extractive data practices, as well as discomfort and concern vocalised by impacted communities themselves. By embodying the preferences of funders, the use of biometrics prioritises external actors and limits the scope of choice, agency and possibility for local actors.
Extraction of market value from humanitarian contexts
Technology and coloniality in the humanitarian sector are both intertwined with and mutually reinforce other systems of power, including capitalism. Capitalism is by definition unequal and extractive (i.e. in a world of limited resources, there are those who have capital and those who do not have capital). Whereas decolonial theory posits that truly decolonial futures are anti-capitalist (and anti-racist and feminist), we have yet to meaningfully unpack the conflict of interest between for-profit (capitalist) technologies and non-profit (decolonising) humanitarian programmes. The increasing role of private sector companies in the deployment of technology in humanitarian spaces warrants discussion. One example is WFP’s partnership with Palantir, a CIA-backed company that gained infamy due to its immigration enforcement support.
When technology is developed in the Global North by companies accountable for delivering dividends to their shareholders, many of the technologies ultimately deployed in the humanitarian sector are not designed by or for those who end up using it or those whose data is collected. Simply put, technology development is reflective of where funding comes from.
This extends to biometric technology. Issues with fingerprint scanners not operating properly on those with darker skin tones or who are agricultural or manual labourers, or diminished functionality of iris scanners with elderly people, can lead to exclusion from services. Currently, little data has been collected on the rates of failure, but in humanitarian contexts, where biometrics are often mandatory for accessing basic necessities, the consequences of biometric technology failing could prevent individuals accessing critical necessities and services.
Biometric technology is not typically developed for humanitarian contexts, or by or for those who must use it. In many of the examples where biometrics have been introduced into humanitarian programmes, this has been done mandatorily, either as the only option given to identify and verify a person or by the exclusion of alternatives. The enforced use of previously untested technology in the humanitarian sector raises concerns around the meaningful consent of communities.
The excitement – and funding opportunities – over ‘innovation’ in the sector, which sees humanitarian organisations increasingly introducing potential sources of risk through the adoption of unproven technology, renders humanitarian contexts a testing ground for experimentation. There is generally good recognition amongst humanitarian practitioners of the need for ethical and responsible pilot design. However, the growing experimentation with technology in the sector, where private sector technology is used or where funding is directly provided by private companies, presents an inherent tension between desirable outcomes and the replication of a colonial pattern where technological advances are used to scrutinise those in the majority world.
Conclusion
Ultimately, biometrics are by nature physically invasive and extractive. As humanitarian agencies collect, measure and extract information from a person’s physical body in order to assess their worthiness of trust and aid, biometrics mimic particularly nefarious expressions of historic colonialism. It is difficult then to justify this extraction of biometric data en masse, especially when paired with experimentation and financial benefit for technology developers.
Though there is an awareness and admission of the potential harms of biometric use, many organisations shy away from asking the fundamental question: are narratives about fraud and efficiency enough to balance out the risk of introducing these technologies? Given the degree of potential harm, we believe the answer is no. The reluctance and lethargy around confronting the real and acute trade-offs of biometric use render decolonisation efforts insincere.
Decolonising humanitarian operations in practice has proven incredibly complex. Moving too fast can shift burdens to local partners rather than power. Equally, moving too slow means the continuation of harmful practices and the potential introduction of new forms of coloniality. Alternatives to highly extractive biometric technologies are possible; work by CISPA and the ICRC into privacy-preserving humanitarian aid distribution and the use of non-biometric forms of identification in the humanitarian response in Ukraine demonstrate the need to consider both the why and the how of technology uptake in the sector. Taking the decision to interrogate the use of such technologies is an important way to avoid replicating new colonialities in humanitarian work, and creates opportunities to meaningfully engage in holistic efforts to decolonise the wider humanitarian sector.
Quito Tsui
Research Consultant, Independent
linkedin.com/in/quito-t-2ab118133/
Elizabeth Shaughnessy
Digital Programmes Lead, Oxfam GB
linkedin.com/in/elizabethshaughnessy/